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ABSTRACT 
 
New Tool for Proliferation Resistance Evaluation Applied to Uranium and Thorium 
Fueled Fast Reactor Fuel Cycles. 
(May 2009) 
Richard Royce Madison Metcalf, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. William Charlton 
                                                  Dr. Jean Ragusa 
 
The comparison of nuclear facilities based on their barriers to nuclear material 
proliferation has remained a difficult endeavor, often requiring expert elicitation for each 
system under consideration. However, objectively comparing systems using a set of 
computable metrics to derive a single number representing a system is not, in essence, a 
nuclear nonproliferation specific problem and significant research has been performed 
for business models. For instance, Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) methods 
have been used previously to provide an objective insight of the barriers to proliferation. 
In this paper, the Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed 
Risk (PRAETOR), a multi-tiered analysis tool based on the multiplicative MAUA 
method, is presented. It folds sixty three mostly independent metrics over three levels of 
detail to give an ultimate metric for nonproliferation performance comparison. In order 
to reduce analysts’ bias, the weighting between the various metrics was obtained by 
surveying a total of thirty three nonproliferation specialists and nonspecialists from 
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fields such as particle physics, international policy, and industrial engineering. The 
PRAETOR was used to evaluate the Fast Breeder Reactor Fuel Cycle (FBRFC). The 
results obtained using these weights are compared against a uniform weight approach. 
Results are presented for five nuclear material diversion scenarios: four examples 
include a diversion attempt on various components of a PUREX fast reactor cycle and 
one scenario involves theft from a PUREX facility in a LWR cycle. The FBRFC was 
evaluated with uranium-plutonium fuel and a second time using thorium-uranium fuel. 
These diversion scenarios were tested with both uniform and expert weights, with and 
without safeguards in place. The numerical results corroborate nonproliferation truths 
and provide insight regarding fast reactor facilities' proliferation resistance in relation to 
known standards.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS WORK 
Introduction 
Nuclear nonproliferation is a field that was born the moment the first nuclear 
weapon was detonated. As long as nuclear facilities exist, the threat of the proliferation 
of weapons-usable material will continue to be a significant concern. A comparison of 
the proliferation resistance (PR) of fuel cycles has been in discussion for over thirty 
years, with a significant amount of the original research involved in fast reactor 
technology.1 Major US initiatives in nuclear power in the past five years have included 
clauses related to nuclear nonproliferation: the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP) program discusses new reactors with higher PR2 while the Advanced Fuel 
Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is based on creating technology that has more PR3.  
The ability to evaluate PR is a required component of any thorough analysis of 
various cycles. Failing to evaluate the PR of a cycle objectively and clearly leads to 
misunderstandings, over and underestimates of risk, and misallocation of limited 
resources. The term proliferation resistance is not a quality that is well understood by the 
community at large and is often defined differently by different stakeholders.  
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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In this work, the definition used will be “a measure of the relative increase in 
barriers [both intrinsic to the material or process and extrinsic (or engineered)] to impede 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons by diversion of material”, which is an adaptation 
from previous work by Charlton et al. 4 
In previous work, several methods have been developed to determine the PR and 
relative risk between different fuel cycles and facilities. However, the majority of these 
works have fatal flaws built into their approaches such as subjective analysis, inability to 
give reproducible results, highly resource-intensive analyses, failing to consider all 
information, being dependent on having more information than can be reasonably 
expected, or reporting information in too simple or too complex a format. One work, the 
Giannangeli method5, was determined to have avoided most of these flaws but had not 
been completely developed.  
The objective of this research was to create a new tool of evaluating PR by 
updating the Giannangeli method and test this new tool with the evaluation of the 
uranium-plutonium and thorium-uranium fuel cycles of fast reactor systems. 
Giannageli’s main goal was to create the attributes and inputs for a PR analysis. This 
work takes the original attributes, adds to them, refines the risk structure, more correctly 
weights the attributes, creates a new evaluation tool, tests the sensitivity of that tool, and 
applies it to a pair of fast reactor fuel cycles.  
Outline 
This Thesis first briefly explains the previous work in PR analysis, especially as 
it is applied to fast reactor systems. The system developed by Giannangeli is then 
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explained in detail. Chapter II describes the creation of the Proliferation Resistance 
Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR). It begins with an 
explanation of the updated attributes, and then reveals the methodology and risk 
approaches added. Chapter III describes the survey methodology to generate a new 
weighting structure. A brief sensitivity analysis of PRAETOR is given in Chapter IV.  
Chapter V describes the fast reactor cycles to be considered, followed by the diversion 
scenarios envisioned to test the relative PR in the cycle. The results of these scenarios as 
evaluated by PREATOR are found in Chapter VI. Chapter VII discusses the future work 
and immediate next steps to be taken by the PRAETOR team. Chapter VIII concludes 
and reviews the Thesis. The appendices include a primer on risk and public perception of 
risk, the multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) theory on which the current work is 
based, the detailed results from the weighting survey performed, the full scenario values 
for analysis, the detailed results of the sensitivity tests on PRAETOR, and the full 
program data of PRAETOR in FORTRAN 90.  
Previous Work in General Proliferation Resistance Methods 
Previous work in evaluating PR is available in literature. There has been a long 
history in finding a cohesive way to compare two independent systems and few systems 
warranted as much attention as nuclear facilities. A survey of the published literature 
regarding available PR assessment methodologies as proposed by different institutions is 
listed below. Three independent reviews by Krakowski6, Takaki et al7, and Giannangeli 
highlight the available methodologies put forth by IAEA (INPRO - INternational 
PROject on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycle)8, GEN IV experts’ group (PRPP - 
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Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection)9, AFCI (Advanced Fuel Cycle 
Initiatives) multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) methodology (Ref. 4)., JAEA’s FS 
Project (Feasibility Studies on commercialized fast reactor cycle system)10, TOPS 
(Technological Opportunities to increase the Proliferation resistance of global civilian 
nuclear power Systems methodology)11, BNL (Brookhaven National Lab 
methodology)12, SNL RIPA (Sandia National Laboratory Risk Informed Probabilistic 
Analysis)13, and SAPRA (Simplified Approach for PR Assessment of nuclear 
systems)14.  
The above-mentioned methods have their merits and limits, which have been 
detailed by Giannangeli [Ref. 5]. In brief many rely on qualitative assessments (TOPS, 
JAEA, PRPP), repeated attributes (JAEA), assumptions to the linearity of diversion 
(INPRO), or that each analysis is very expensive to perform (PRPP, most qualitative 
methods). 
Previous Work in Fast Reactor System Proliferation Resistance 
In addition to the above methods, special attention has been paid to PR analyses 
on FBRFC systems. The analysis by Ahmed et al 15 used the multi-attribute decision 
model to find the potential routes of nuclear proliferation.  Eleven routes were 
considered in their study including the FBR route. Heising et al16 also used the multi-
attribute decision model with three different nuclear energy systems, vis-à-vis once 
through LWR, LWR coupled with FBR and a thorium cycle coupled with an advanced 
converter-breeder system. Both of the above studies were concluded about 25 years ago 
and so no longer represent the changing threat environment. The ongoing Japanese 
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initiative to address issues in assessing and maximizing PR for future commercial FBR 
systems (to be completed by 2015) is reported by Sagayama17. Finally, a recent PR 
assessment work carried out for the Russian fast reactors BN-600 and BN-800 applying 
the MAUA based methodology for tightly coupled plutonium recycling between fast 
reactors and reprocessing facility is found in Zrodnikov et al18. 
Zrodnikov is the most recent completed work regarding fast reactor PR. The 
Zrodnikov method was a time dependent risk exposure method using a linear aggregate 
of potential risks. This method involves the use of discount factors to consider future 
technological improvements, and follows a set inventory of fuel through the fuel cycle.i 
This approach is similar to the Texas A&M MAUA method developed except for the 
inclusion of discounting factors and replacement of utility analysis with “plutonium 
attractiveness.” The method is geared more towards the evaluation of risk over time 
rather than in a moment of time, and is based primarily on plutonium attractiveness. The 
method itself is also general, but was applied to fast reactors as a demonstration.  
SAPRA and Giannangeli’s Method Introduction 
The Giannangeli method is a MAUA (See Appendix B) method that is an 
extension and adaptation of the SAPRA method developed by AREVA Inc. This 
subchapter describes the SAPRA method and then the Giannangeli method which is the 
basis for the PRAETOR.   
 
 
                                                 
i This is an adaptation of economic discounting because of depreciation. 
6 
 
 
Overview of SAPRA 
SAPRA is an expansion of already existing methods: TOPS and JAEA. SAPRA has 
been completed recently and has published at least one comprehensive analysis of a fuel 
cycle.19 SAPRA assumes that there are four stages to acquisition to a nuclear weapon by 
diversion: diversion of nuclear material, transportation of the nuclear material to a 
second site, transformation of the material into a weapons-usable form, and 
weaponization of the material by adding a physics package. During each of these stages 
of proliferation, there are barriers which inhibit the progress of the proliferator to obtain 
a successful weapon. These barriers are often left generic, such as “Material” or 
“Institutional” to encompass all possible barriers. A specific point during a fuel cycle is 
chosen for evaluation. Each of the potential barriers to proliferation is then rated by a 
panel of experts on a scale from zero to four with zero being no barrier at all and four 
being an extremely resistant barrier. The scores for each barrier are then summed and 
normalized to one to give an average value of the resistance for each barrier. The 
average value of all of the barriers to proliferation is then assigned the PR of that stage 
(e.g. diversion). In the study of Ref. 19, the overall PR was defined as the average of the 
PR for each of the stages. There are several reasons this final PR value may be 
questionable:  
1. Some barriers to proliferation are more important than others because some 
barriers may have multiple impeding-factors folded into a single barrier. For 
example, a “Radiation” barrier may have “damage to electronics by neutrons” 
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and “Potentially lethal dose” together. Furthermore, adding too many potential 
factors can dilute the influence of any given barrier.  
2.  The scale of values is not the same for each attribute. There are very different 
considerations for how a proliferator could overcome the barrier of “Material 
handling” compared to “Being detected by Safeguards” The definitions for low, 
medium, high, and very high resistance are not numeric. 
3. The system is founded fundamentally on a panel of experts. PR is a measurement 
of a quality that is difficult to quantify; a very large panel would be required to 
ensure that the values reported are close to the true, relative PR between fuel 
systems. Current panels likely will not provide repeatable results. 
4. The SAPRA method has assumed independent attributes and uses a direct 
averaging scheme rather than take any assumption regarding the enemy intent 
aspect of the risk equation (See Appendix A). As a result, the SAPRA method 
more accurately portrays the vulnerability of a facility, rather than the risk.  
The SAPRA method does have some excellent qualities, despite these flaws. The 
division of the proliferation into four, clearly required stages helps show a second layer 
of information that is valuable to evaluators. The idea of finding independent attributes 
to test and considering these as an aggregate is a great step forward. Finally, the analysis 
of the once-through and MOX recycle fuel cycles [Ref. 19] proved that no system has 
perfect PR, international safeguards can have significant impact, and most material has 
some intrinsic barriers to proliferation. 
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Overview of Giannangeli’s Method 
Giannangeli improved on the SAPRA method by adding extra layers of 
information, changing the aggregation scheme, and seeking a more objective analysis by 
avoiding the use of expert panels. These additions created a system which serves as an 
excellent foundation for future tools. 
The Giannageli method is designed exclusively to handle diversion, similar to the 
SAPRA method. It is based on MAUA (See Appendix B) using a two tier analysis of 
very detailed information feeding into the higher stages of diversion, transportation, 
transformation, and weaponization. This detailed information was a set of 53 attributes 
[Ref. 5] that represented barriers to proliferation in the four stages to a weapon taken 
from a draft of a comprehensive report on PR attributes.20  
Rather than having a panel evaluate the relative PR values for each case for each 
barrier, the attributes chosen were to be quantifiable. For example, the idea of the barrier 
for “material bulk” became the mass per significant quantity (SQii) and volume per SQ 
of material. The mass per significant quantity of material is not directly correlated to the 
PR. As a result, utility functions were created. Utility functions turn inputs for attributes 
into a normalized PR value for a given attribute, which can be input into an overarching 
methodology. This is shown graphically in Fig 1. 
                                                 
ii
 One SQ of material is the amount of material for which the possibility of creating a weapon cannot be 
excluded according to the IAEA and forms the backbone definition for international safeguards. 
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Figure 1. Giannangeli Aggregation Methodology 
 
 
The chosen methodology was two-tier multiplicative MAUA. To use the chosen 
MAUA, utility functions for each of the attributes had to be created, the weights for each 
attribute needed to be assigned, and a choice regarding the risk-seeking, risk neutral, or 
risk-averse nature of the enemy was needed. The focus of Giannageli’s work was the 
creation of the utility functions for the attributes. As a result, equal weighting was 
assumed and the sum of the weights was chosen to be 2.0 (risk-seeking) for 
mathematical simplicity. An example case of a small special nuclear materials (SNF) 
facility was presented.  
Giannangeli’s method addressed a few of the above concerns about SAPRA. The 
expert elicitation was replaced with a more objective utility analysis, which allowed for 
repeatable results and less bias. The new two-tier aggregation scheme was not linear and 
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so did imply a belief regarding the enemy-intent. However, there is room for significant 
improvement on the Giannangeli method: 
1. The choice of uniform weights still does not address the issue that some barriers 
are more valuable than others. In Giannangeli’s method, the sonic load from a 
transmutation facility was as important as radioactive releases. 
2. Because the method was only two-tiered, the second tier attributes such as 
“Material handling during weaponization” were three times as important as 
“Knowledge and Skills needed to design and fabricate a weapon.”  
3. Choosing the sum of all weights equal to 2.0 for mathematical simplicity 
unintentionally implies risk behavior by the proliferator (See Appendix A), and 
likely does not portray the true risk to the facility.  
4. Giannangeli’s method was based on an earlier draft of the attribute list, which 
was missing attributes and furthermore had several duplicated entries, leading to 
an overemphasis on certain attributes and underemphasis of others.  
5. Several attributes were ignored because their utility functions were considered to 
be too difficult to evaluate or the information was unavailable at the time. Other 
attributes (mostly probabilities) assumed risk neutral behavior by the proliferator 
in contrast to the assumptions made by the choice of weights (as seen in item 3).  
11 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
UPDATES TO THE METHODOLOGY: ATTRIBUTES, UTILITY 
FUNCTIONS, AND RISK 
Introduction 
In order to help expand this previous work, several steps have been taken. The 
analysis has been made into a fully three-tiered system. Some attributes which did not 
exist in previous drafts of the attribute list have been included. Utility functions for these 
attributes have been created, as well as for a few of the attributes which Gianngeli 
dismissed. To reflect the evolving technology, a new attribute based on process 
monitoring was included in the attribute list. A new function to consider risk was 
included for individual attributes, and the method was expanded overall to allow for 
risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior by the proliferator. The list of attributes used in this 
work can be found in Appendix C.  
Three Tier Analysis 
Unlike the Giannangeli analysis which only had two tiers, the PRAETOR is three-
tiered. The most important part in designing a metric is defining what information is 
important to include and how much information to report. Requiring too much 
information increases the resource requirements of an analysis for little benefit or  
provides an analysis which is difficult to understand. Not including enough information 
decreases the resolution such that conclusions cannot be drawn, or are drawn incorrectly.  
Hence, a three tier approach to fold multitudes of optimal information from attributes to 
a single metric is applied. The interest in a tiered approach is to retain the scientific 
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objectivity without overloading any given stakeholder with minutiae. A nuclear 
nonproliferation specialist will obviously be interested in the first tier, while a policy 
specialist may only have the time and background to make analyses and take decisions 
primarily based on the third tier, with scientific advisors possibly advising based on the 
first and second tiers. This multi-tier approach is enumerated below and shown in Fig. 2:  
1. At the first tier, each attribute is assigned a utility function and derives a utility 
value between zero and one. These derived utility values are carried forward to 
the second tier. Deriving values for the attributes often requires significant 
simulation and analysis of the system. Examples include “IAEA imagery analysis 
rate” or “neutrons per second per gram of material.” In many cases, it could be 
impossible for the analyst in question to determine the exact values because of 
the classification or concerns about the use of proprietary information. However, 
if the information is available, PRAETOR provides an ability to use the 
information. These values and functions tend to not be intuitively obvious to non-
specialists.   
2. The second tier utility values are a combination of lower tier utility values with a 
chosen weight structure. Second tier utility values include “material handling 
during diversion” and “knowledge and skills needed to fabricate a weapon.” 
These are intended to be intuitively obvious and clear to both specialist and 
nonspecialist, but still are not sufficiently clear for easy communication to non-
technically-trained decision makers. Many of these functions could be evaluated 
by expert elicitation, if the specific data for the lowest tier were unavailable.  
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3. The third tier, or overview, combines the utility values from the second tier and 
their respective weights. It consists of only four utility values: Diversion, 
Transportation, Transformation, and Weaponization. These four stages are 
combined into a single metric for comparison of systems. These four utility 
values in the third tier level are obvious to all stakeholders, regardless of 
technical background.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Three-Tier Results Move Information Forward 
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New Utility Functions 
A total of 12 new attributes have been added: 11 of the 12 were updates from the 
most recent attribute list. The majority of these attributes were added to the diversion 
stage. Two second tier utilities were added:  
1) “Difficulty of Making Facility Modifications” and  
2) “Difficulty of Evading IAEA with Covert Facility Modifications.”  
Under the “Difficulty of Making Facility Modifications” second tier, seven new 
attributes have been added. Four of the new attributes are binary:  
1) “Is there enough physical space to make modifications?”,  
2) “Are remote handling tools required?”, 
3) “Are specialized tools required?” and  
4) “Does the process need to be halted for modification.”  
These binary functions are assigned a utility value of zero if the answer is no and one if 
the answer is yes. Two of the added attributes use the risk function explained in the 
following section regarding risk and follow expected risk-perception behavior as 
described in Appendix A: 
1) “Risk of penetrating containment” and 
2) “Probability of being caught (by IAEA)”, 
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The first continuous new utility function is the “Amount of Material Available at 
Facility”. Facilities which handle only one SQ of material are more likely to notice if 
their entire stockpile is missing. Facilities which handle hundreds of SQ regularly have 
more flexibility in hiding diversion in bias errors and miscalibrations. The utility 
function used to assign the utility value for this attribute is shown as Eq. 1 and Fig. 3. 
In Eq. 1, u(SQ) is the utility value, and SQ is the number of SQs at a facility. 
This function states that no SQ in a given facility represents perfect proliferation 
resistance and that 200 SQ in a facility (roughly 1/3 the total yearly throughput of the 
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan21) has a lower proliferation resistance. The 
rational for this function is when a few SQ exist, the protection effort per SQ is higher, 
following international practice where no gradation of safeguards is currently in use. For 
instance, a hot cell facility (about 5 SQ) has a utility value regarding availability of 
material of 0.9, whereas a large reprocessing facility (about 100 SQ), has a utility value 
of 0.33.  
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Figure 3. Plot of PR vs Amount of Material Available at Facility 
 
 
In Eq. 1, u(SQ) is the utility value, and SQ is the number of SQs at a facility. 
This function states that no SQ in a given facility represents perfect proliferation 
resistance and that 200 SQ in a facility (roughly 1/3 the total yearly throughput of the 
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan) has a lower proliferation resistance. The rational 
for this function is when a few SQ exist, the protection effort per SQ is higher, following 
international practice where no gradation of safeguards is currently in use. For instance, 
a hot cell facility (about 5 SQ) has a utility value regarding availability of material of 
0.9, whereas a large reprocessing facility (about 100 SQ), has a utility value of 0.33.  
The next new attribute, “Number of People required for modifications, measured 
in person-years” uses the shifted sigmoid function given as Eq. 2. In Eq. 2, u(p) is the 
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utility, a=100and b=0.1 are constants which affect the transition between a low utility 
value and a high utility value, and p is the number of person-years that are required of 
people who have access to the area that must be modified. Figure 3 shows this function 
graphically. It is assumed that 100 person-years represents perfect proliferation 
resistance, and there is a smooth transition between lower PR and higher PR.  
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Figure 4. Plot of PR vs Person-years with Access. 
The “Risk of modification, measured in lives-lost,” attribute was added. This 
attribute is difficult to quantify because the belief that life is sacred is culturally 
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dependent. This analysis assumes that a proliferator will be hesitant to lose educated 
personnel because of loss of morale, moral high ground, and limited educated personnel. 
However, if a proliferator is willing to lose one life, they are unlikely be dissuaded from 
killing more, until a maximum risk is reached at 20 lives, at which point it becomes 
difficult to conceal that many deaths of trained personnel at a facility. The utility 
function assumed is given as Eq. 3 and Fig. 5, in which R is the average number of lives 
lose to make modifications.  
. 4 6 *                                   f o r  R < 1( R )
0 . 2 2 9 9 2 1 * L n ( + 1 ) + 0 . 3  f o r  R 2 0
R
u
R

=  ≤
   
(3)  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Plot of PR vs Expected Loss of Life 
The “Number of Experts” in Giannangeli’s work was broken down into 
“Advanced Degree Work” and “Technical Experts”. The “Advanced Degree Work, 
measured in person-years” utility function represents work that would be expected from 
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a first year graduate student, while “Technical Experts” represent an advanced degree 
scientist with years of technical training and experience in a particular field, such as a 
metallurgist who has specialized in plutonium metallic phases. The utility function for 
“Advanced Degree Work” is uses the shifted sigmoid function given as Eq. 2 using 
a=100and b=0.1, with p the number of person-years. These constants were chosen 
because it was assumed that 100 person-years was representative of a perfect PR value. 
Because the “Number of Experts” was split, the “Technical Experts, in person-years” 
was and changed to be the shifted sigmoid as well, though using a=500and b=0.3, under 
the assumption that 50 person-years was perfectly proliferation resistant. “Advanced 
Degree Work” and “Technical Experts” are shown as Figs. 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Plot of PR vs Advanced Degree Work Years. 
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Figure 7. Plot of PR vs Technical Expert Years 
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Figure 8. Plot of PR vs Probability of Nondetection 
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The final new utility function for an existing attribute is the “Sensitivity of IAEA 
equipment.” The “Sensitivity of IAEA equipment” utility value is measured by the false 
negative rateiii. The PR drops rapidly with error rate, and it assumed that the IAEA 
would never field any measurement system with an error rate greater than 20%. An error 
of 20% is still better than nothing, and so only under the conditions of no safeguards 
would the utility value drop to zero. This function was designed to show a decrease of 
0.1 approximately every 1% error increase, but still be exponential and represent 
diminishing returns. The function is shown as Eq. 4 and Fig. 8, in which E is the false 
negative rate. 
New Attribute: Detection by Process Monitoring 
Process monitoring is not a new technology in nuclear nonproliferation, but it has 
recently received significant attention as part of the suite of safeguards technologies. As 
a result, it has been included as a new attribute in PRAETOR. This utility function uses 
the probability of detection by process monitoring, determined from prior calculations, 
to estimate the PR by the use of the risk function (given in the following section).  
                                                 
iii
 This is the percentage of measurements which fail to detect a diversion 
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New Overall Risk Approach in PRAETOR 
All risk based functions normalized between zero and one use the new risk 
function. The risk function is assumed from the Prospect Theory of psychological risk.22 
A detailed description of risk and the associated perception of risk are given in Appendix 
A. The PR is assumed to be inversely related to the expected acceptance of risk by the 
proliferator.  The risk function is the shifted sigmoid function, using a=100and b=0.1 
where p is the probability of detection. The analysis of the actual (or perceived) 
detection probability must be performed external to this analysis. The example set (using 
a=100 and b=0.1) of behavior assumed risk, p=25% risk gives a PR value of 0.1 and a 
p=70% risk gives a PR value of 0.9. This universal risk function is shown as Fig 9. In the 
event that a different risk behavior assumption is preferred, the constants can be changed 
to generate more risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior.  
Additionally, the normalization value chosen for the MAUA  in PRAETOR is 
now a free variable instead of a defined value of 2.0 as it was in the previous work. The 
previous work assumed that the proliferator was risk-averse, which may or may not be 
true. Furthermore, as the majority of evaluations are greater than PR=0.5, the differential 
change in PR per change in individual utility value is drastically lower in the previous 
work compared to an assumption that the proliferator is risk-seeking. This is explained 
in more detail and can be seen graphically in Fig 15 of Appendix B. The PRAETOR’s 
ability to handle the normalization value as a free variable allows for differing degrees of 
risk-seeking and risk aversion behavior by the proliferator, but does not have the ability 
to allow a transition between risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior because the utility 
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value must be calculated using an assumption of behavior. In the future work section, an 
iteration scheme to allow this change in behavior is described.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Plot of PR vs Probability of Detection 
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CHAPTER III 
NEW WEIGHTS BY SURVEY 
Introduction 
The choice of weights is crucial to MAUA analysis. Earlier work assumed 
uniform weighting, but this work improved upon that model by using a survey of 
stakeholders to determine the appropriate weighting structure. The survey methodology 
is presented by first explaining the participants involved. The actual method in which the 
survey was performed is presented second, including a brief explanation of the observed 
survey fatigue. Finally, the outliers which were removed from the sample set are 
explained and the final weights and their associated uncertainty are tabled. 
Description of Participants 
The choice of participants can have a large impact on the weighting scheme 
determined. For this weight search, expert and nonexpert opinions were both elicited. 
Complete random sampling could not be achieved because of the limited access to the 
communities in question. However, equal solicitation was made of available participants. 
A total of 33 interviews were performed from January 2008 to April 2008. 
Experts included nonproliferation specialists from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI), Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Savannah River National Lab (SRS), Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Los Alamos National Lab (LANL). 
Nonexperts included reactor physicists, former weapon scientists, industrial engineers, 
26 
 
 
 
transport theory specialists, health physicists, particle physicists, chemical engineers, and 
policy specialists of the Monterrey Institute of International Studies and the Bush School 
of Government and Public Service.  
Description of Method and Survey 
The surveys were presented in a top down manner: the participant would assign 
weights to the four stages of diversion (third tier), and then to the problems associated 
with each stage in order of the four stages (second tier), and then each of the attributes 
within each of the problems in order of the stages (first tier). Each participant weighted 
an attribute from 0-10, with 0 being “absolutely not important at all” and 10 being “This 
is likely the most important attribute”. The survey participants were informed they were 
assigning weight not based on how difficult they found the stages, but how much 
emphasis or importance should be put on an attribute when it is considered in the 
analysis. If this was unclear to a participant, the participant was asked to consider the 
following: “If you could choose to put money into increasing the difficulty (with a linear 
increase based on money) of any of these attributes, where would you choose to put your 
money” and “Or, consider these attributes in that if you would rather the proliferator 
have a harder time with X than Y, then you want to rate X relatively higher than Y.” In 
each of the presented categories, participants were informed the weights they assigned 
would be renormalized to sum to 1.0. The surveys to determine the weights of these 
various attributes were given in person by the same researcher, with standardized 
language. In some cases, multiple surveys were given at the same time by written 
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response.  Surveys from March 2008 and April 2008 had the option to stop the survey 
after the second tier stage because of an observation of survey fatigue.   
Four participants of the survey, all non-experts, actively stated they were 
suffering from survey fatigue, with two respondents unwilling to continue after a certain 
period of time. Survey fatigue is an increasing decrease in the responsiveness of a survey 
participant.23 This can be characterized by refusal to continue, rapid and uniform 
response, or patterns in response based on question. The majority of survey fatigue 
studies have concluded that longer surveys and lower salience tended to increase survey 
fatigue.24 This lower salience for non-experts may have resulted in faster survey fatigue, 
which would tend to obscure the results. 
Outlier Removal and Analysis 
The survey respondents were divided into two categories: expert (n=11) and non-
expert (n=22). Each respondent provided results for the second and third tiers, with 15 
respondents completing the entire survey. An average and standard deviation was 
created based on the responses to each of the utilities. Responses that were outside of 
two standard deviations were reviewed to be possible outliers. These possible outliers 
were vetted and if the outlier was removed, specific reasons for their removal were 
recorded. In one case, the outliers came from the only active member of the IAEA: their 
responses should be discarded or additional IAEA members should be included to better 
represent the sample. In another case, the expert in question specialized in counter-
proliferation and arms control and explicitly explained that “none of these really matter” 
because it did not address the counter-proliferation concerns and so a few of their outlier 
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responses were removed. Cases in which outliers were not removed included a weakly 
(statistically insignificant) observed bias based on the laboratory in the Department of 
Energy complex for which a particular expert worked. Eighteen responses were 
discarded from a pool of 1380 total responses, meaning that of the expected 5% of 
potential outliers, only 1.3% of total responses were removed for perceived bias. After 
the outliers were removed, the new average and standard deviation was created.  A two 
sided student-t test25 was then applied to determine if the survey weights were different 
from uniform weights.  
Experts and non-experts alike consider the diversion stage more important than 
uniform weight. They also found weaponization and transportation are less important 
than uniform weights. Experts believe the transformation stage is more important than 
uniform, but no conclusion can be made at any reasonable confidence from the non-
expert group. Experts favored physical and nuclear characteristics of materials, often 
focusing on a few measurable quantities. Non-experts assigned weights more broadly, 
giving chemistry and heat more weight. Both groups favored proven technologies and 
rejected the new attribute of process monitoring. Experts tended to have more correlated 
responses than non-experts and had more statistically conclusive results, despite having 
half as many respondents. The full results of the student-t tests for the experts, non-
experts, and mixed group can be found in detail in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SENSITIVITY OF PRAETOR 
Introduction 
The derived PRAETOR requires a sensitivity analysis to better understand the 
operating space. The method being designed is a relative measure: it is important to 
garner an understanding of the spread to draw conclusions from the results. PRAETOR, 
like any MAUA method, gives a final, unit-less value for comparison. A value of 0.69 is 
greater than 0.60, but because the values have no units, they must be put into context.  
Furthermore, the impact of individual utility values in the system must be explored. 
Individual utility values could act as “redeeming qualities,” attributes about the system 
which could drive the ultimate PR to one or zero. There are some circumstances in 
which an analyst may find this acceptable. For instance, consider the extreme case of an 
assembled nuclear device on the moon. While every aspect of the device itself would 
indicate a low PR value, the fact that it is in a hostile environment and requires technical 
sophistication that only weapons-states have managed should indicate a very strong PR 
value. However, “redeeming qualities” have a downside. When significant emphasis is 
placed on a small number of (what appear to be) nearly insurmountable challenges, 
safeguards or security, it may be that the assumed challenges have a low-tech bypass or 
a detail has been overlooked. The choice of weights and type of MAUA method 
determine if “redeeming qualities” can exist. The PRAETOR’s choice of attributes does 
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not appear to lend itself to creating truly insurmountable challenges, and as a result 
PRAETOR has been designed to exclude the possibility of “redeeming qualities.”  
An understanding of the sensitivity of PRAETOR to safeguards can be used in 
trade-off and cost-benefit analyses in relation to detection capabilities. There has been 
significant debate over how to determine the cost-effectiveness of safeguards, and the 
IAEA openly states that they need to minimize their safeguards implementation cost.26 
PRAETOR can show the impact of safeguards into both low PR and high PR values, as 
well as evaluating the PR between very risk-seeking to very risk-averse adversaries. An 
understanding of the impact of IAEA-implemented safeguards, coupled with an 
economic understanding of the cost of those safeguards, allows for a cost-benefit 
analysis based on an analysis with minimal subjectivity.  
Finally, PRAETOR was designed such that the effects of any utility value on the 
overall utility should be first order. The second order effects should be based on the 
weighting to the attributes and the change of combinations of attributes. Because the 
PRAETOR method’s expert-weights are reasonably close to a uniform weighting 
structure, it is expected that there will not be any observed second order effects, but this 
will be proven by the following sensitivity analysis.  
Method of Sensitivity Measurements 
The system is an adaptation of the multiplicative MAUA method and not the 
linear-additive MAUA method. It was expected that while the impact of a utility value 
would be very close to linear, the magnitude of the impact per change in the utility 
(slope) would change, depending on the relationship of the tested utility to all other 
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utilities. Second order terms should only appear if an individual utility value is weighted 
much more highly than other utility values in its category. As described in Appendix B, 
it is expected that there is a more significant impact for each change in the utility 
function as the overall PR becomes closer to one for the risk-seeking case, with less 
impact for the risk-averse case.  In order to determine the impact of each utility value 
(and associated input) to the final utility value, each utility value was varied while the 
other utility values were held constant.iv This sensitivity was measured for both a high 
PR value of 0.824 and low PR value of 0.665. These low and high values were chosen 
by comparing a uranium-plutonium fast reactor fresh fuel assembly with no safeguards 
in place to the more diversion resistant uranium-plutonium spent fuel with full 
INFCIRC/540 international safeguards and the additional protocol in effect.27 Each 
attribute with a continuous function was evaluated at fifty points between utility values 
of zero and one for both final utility conditions.  
Results of Sensitivity Measurements 
The impact of each attribute is given graphically in Appendix D. An example set 
of five attributes spanning the range of impact for the high PR case is shown below as 
Fig 10. An example set of the same five attributes spanning the range of impact for the 
low PR cast is shown below as Fig. 11. A set of safeguards-based utility function 
sensitivities are shown for the high PR cast in Fig. 12. In all graphs, the abscissa is the 
                                                 
iv
 This was a purely numerical exercise to estimate the sensitivity of attributes and does not reflect a set of 
individual, likely cases. Furthermore, as will be described in future work, some attributes are linked.  
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scale of the utility value from zero to one, while the ordinate is the change in the overall 
utility value.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Five Example Utility Values and Impact (high PR case) 
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Figure 11. Five Example Utility Values and Impact (low PR case) 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Safeguards-based Utility Function Impact (high PR case)  
 
 
As expected, the utility value impact in the high PR case is larger and the utility 
value impact in the low PR case is smaller. No attributes acted as “redeeming qualities.” 
All attributes showed a linear impact on the final utility value, with no observed second 
order impact. This helps verify that the code is working as intended and gives insight 
into the "effective" weighting of an individual attribute through the three tiers. 
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CHAPTER V 
TEST OF PARADIGMATIC CASES FOR VERIFICATION 
Introduction 
The PRAETOR should not be applied to the evaluation of a new facility type 
without considering a set of paradigmatic cases that represent a set of possible diversions 
which are ranked in order of difficulty. Additionally, in order to verify that the weights 
are having the appropriate impact, these paradigmatic cases are tested with the survey 
weights and a set of “wrong” weights. All of these cases are taken from the light water 
reactor (LWR) cycle.  
Cases Considered 
All cases are taken from the LWR cycle and are cases for which the relative 
ranking of proliferation resistance is intuitive (and agrees with previous work, as in Ref 
4 & 5). Each of these cases is considered without safeguards because safeguards would 
be applied differently to each case. The four cases are: uranium ore, in an active reactor, 
during PUREX reprocessing, and low-burnup plutonium metal.  
The first case is natural uranium in a mine. This case represents a pathway of a 
totally indigenous development of a uranium weapon using enrichment technology. In 
this scenario, the ore is "diverted" away from the destination of a conversion facility to a 
clandestine conversion facility and enrichment facility, before finally being fabricated 
into a little-boy style device.  
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The second case of an active reactor is a pathway in which the proliferator 
chooses to attempt to remove the material while the reactor is operating. This is regarded 
as the most difficult of proliferation scenarios; the IAEA only provides seals on the 
reactor to see if the core is shut down and containment breached. The material is 
removed from the reactor, transported hot to a clandestine reprocessing facility, and 
eventually fabricated into an implosion style weapon using the plutonium. The material 
is assumed to be near the end of life.  
The third case is the diversion of material as it is being reprocessed in a PUREX 
reprocessing facility. This case is taken from Giannangeli. The material is diverted after 
fission product removal but before the Pu is separated from the TRU. For a more 
detailed description of this case, see the following chapters.  
The final paradigmatic case is the diversion of a hypothetical low-burnup 
plutonium metal pit. This material should have the lowest proliferation resistance, as the 
material does not any additional transmutation, is not self-protecting, and has all the best 
possible properties for a plutonium weapon. This material is diverted and then 
transported to a weaponizing lab to generate a physics package for this specific pit.  
Additional “Wrong” Weights 
The diversion cases presented above are evaluated with survey weights and 
“wrong” weights. The ranking of the paradigmatic cases should be in the following 
order: plutonium pit, PUREX removal, natural uranium in-reactor diversion. The 
weights designed for the PRAETOR method based on survey should place these in the 
appropriate order. The “wrong” weights should drive the evaluation in such a way to 
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change the order, from which the claim that the weights are important in the analysis can 
be verified. This set of weights is based on considering almost only weaponization. A 
similar result as that shown below is found if transmutation is considered significantly 
more highly than the other attributes. Major changes to the lower tier attribute weights 
can also generate similar results. The “wrong” weights are presented in Appendix C. 
Results  
The PRs given by PRAETOR for the paradigmatic scenarios are presented below 
as Table 1, along with percent differences between the expert and high-weaponization 
weights. The relative ranking from the PRAETOR for these analyses are given as  
Table 2.  
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Table 1: Results of PRAETOR Analysis for Paradigmatic Cases 
 
       
 Proliferator is Risk Seeking Proliferator is Risk Averse 
 Expert Wrong % Diff Expert Wrong % Diff 
Natural Uranium 
1.78E-
01 
3.73E-
02 131% 5.01E-01 
1.61E-
01 103% 
Diversion 
1.38E-
01 
2.93E-
01 -72% 1.38E-01 
2.93E-
01 -72% 
Transportation 
4.65E-
01 
4.87E-
01 -5% 4.65E-01 
4.87E-
01 -5% 
Transforamtion 
5.80E-
01 
6.09E-
01 -5% 5.80E-01 
6.09E-
01 -5% 
Weaponization 
4.57E-
02 
7.60E-
02 -50% 4.57E-02 
7.60E-
02 -50% 
In Reactor 
2.91E-
01 
2.76E-
01 5% 6.35E-01 
9.99E-
01 -44% 
Diversion 
2.58E-
01 
8.09E-
01 -103% 2.58E-01 
8.09E-
01 -103% 
Transportation 
5.41E-
01 
6.16E-
01 -13% 5.41E-01 
6.16E-
01 -13% 
Transforamtion 
4.96E-
01 
4.73E-
01 5% 4.96E-01 
4.73E-
01 5% 
Weaponization 
5.00E-
01 
5.66E-
01 -12% 5.00E-01 
5.66E-
01 -12% 
Pure Plutonium 
Metal 
6.54E-
02 
1.87E-
01 -96% 2.26E-01 
7.47E-
01 -107% 
Diversion 
3.06E-
02 
1.32E-
01 -125% 3.06E-02 
1.32E-
01 -125% 
Transportation 
1.56E-
01 
1.59E-
01 -2% 1.56E-01 
1.59E-
01 -2% 
Transforamtion 
6.17E-
02 
1.02E-
02 143% 6.17E-02 
1.02E-
02 143% 
Weaponization 
3.03E-
01 
3.79E-
01 -22% 3.03E-01 
3.79E-
01 -22% 
LWR-PUREX 
1.38E-
01 
2.76E-
01 -67% 4.06E-01 
9.99E-
01 -84% 
Diversion 
9.08E-
02 
1.76E-
01 -64% 9.08E-02 
1.76E-
01 -64% 
Transportation 
3.26E-
01 
3.91E-
01 -18% 3.26E-01 
3.91E-
01 -18% 
Transforamtion 
1.35E-
01 
1.33E-
01 2% 1.35E-01 
1.33E-
01 2% 
Weaponization 
5.00E-
01 
5.66E-
01 -12% 5.00E-01 
5.66E-
01 -12% 
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Table 2: Results of Paradigmatic Cases: Relative Rank 
 
 Rank 
 Expert 
Heavy-
Weaponization 
Natural Uranium 
Medium-High 
PR Lowest PR 
In Reactor Highest PR High PR 
Pure Plutonium 
Metal Lowest PR Medium PR 
LWR-PUREX 
Medium-Low 
PR High PR 
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CHAPTER VI 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FAST BREEDER REACTOR FUEL 
CYCLE AND ASSOCIATED DIVERSION PATHWAYS 
Description of the FBRFC 
The FBRFC is an advanced nuclear cycle designed to be fuel producing. These 
reactors’ spent fuel can be reprocessed to recover more fissile material than was 
originally input to the system, hence the term breeder. 28 29 30 31 v The major facilities 
in a generic FBRFC are shown in Figure 1: (1) the fuel fabrication unit, (2) the Fast 
Breeder Reactor (FBR), and (3) the spent fuel reprocessing facility, which includes an 
interim spent fuel storage and a waste management facility on site.  The FBR may be 
fuelled with either highly enriched uranium (235U or 233U) or plutonium.  Because fission 
cross-sections are much lower in the fast neutron energy domain than in the thermal 
region, the fuel must contain higher concentrations of fissile material. The proportions of 
fissile uranium or plutonium in fast-reactor fuel therefore range from 15% to 30% as  
 
 
 
                                                 
v This section is largely borrowed from Ref. 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
compared with 3% to 5% in thermal reactors. The FBR cores are also less uniform than 
thermal-reactor cores. The FBR cores are compact and are typically divided into three 
major regions: inner core, outer core, and blanket region. Fuel cores are loaded with 
driver assemblies in the inner and outer core and are typically surrounded by arrays of 
depleted or natural uranium fuel assemblies (blankets) in which plutonium is produced 
by neutron capture. Future blanket assemblies may be thorium, leading to creation of 
233U by neutron capture. The average core neutron energy spectrum will be in the range 
of a few hundreds of keV compared to that of a few eV in thermal reactors. The FBR 
operates with high power density and uses liquid metal coolant. The fuel burn-up 
achieved is also very high in FBR often three times the normal maximum burn-up of 
thermal reactors. This thesis will assume FBR cores fueled with plutonium driver 
assemblies in which plutonium (15% to 30%) is mixed with uranium (85% to 70%).  
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Figure 13. Schematic of Fast Breeder Reactor Fuel Cycle 
 
 
One of these cores has blanket assemblies with depleted uranium (the uranium-
plutonium cycle), and one has thorium blanket assemblies (thorium-uranium cycle). 
Oxide, carbide, nitride or metallic fuel can be used in the increasing order of usefulness 
in plutonium breeding. Confining the study to the mixed oxide (MOX) fueled cores, the 
plutonium enrichments are ~20% and ~30% in the inner and outer core regions 
respectively.  The varied enrichments are to maintain nearly a uniform radial power 
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distribution.  Plutonium is produced in both blanket and core region through the 
reaction: 
PuNpUnU d
239
4.2,
239
min23,
239238 ),(  → → ββγ  
The FBR core designs are made in such a way that the formation of plutonium in 
the core as well as in the blanket region will exceed the amount of plutonium being 
consumed for power production. The important point to note is that the plutonium bred 
in the core region will be reactor grade, but blanket regions will breed weapons-grade 
plutonium.  This is because the blanket region is less exposed to neutron flux (lower 
burnup), which in turn substantially reduces the conversion of 239Pu isotope into higher 
mass isotopes such as 240Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu. This weapons grade plutonium decreases 
PR significantly. 
The only existing commercially viable option to recover the unspent plutonium 
and uranium is by reprocessing the spent fuel and blanket assemblies using the solvent 
extraction process known as PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction)32 33.  The 
PUREX process used in thermal reactor spent fuel reprocessing requires minor 
modifications for fast reactor spent fuel reprocessing. Modifications are needed to take 
into account the greater plutonium inventories and higher radioactivity content produced 
at higher levels of burn-up. Only in France and the UK has fast-reactor fuel been 
consistently reprocessed and separated plutonium recycled. Although a fast-reactor fuel 
reprocessing facility is currently available in Japan, the non-operation of their fast 
reactors JOYO and MONJU has halted their plutonium recycling for fast reactors.  India 
has demonstrated the reprocessing capability of fast reactor fuels in its pilot plant in 
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2003. India successfully reprocessed the plutonium-uranium carbide spent fuel 
discharged from its fast breeder test reactor (FBTR), which had a burn-up of 100 
GWD/T burn-up.  India has immediate plans to build bigger reprocessing facilities to 
reprocess spent fuel from its proto-type fast breeder reactor (PFBR-500MWe) to be 
commissioned by the year 2010. India has shown significant interest in a thorium-based 
FBRFC and this cycle is arguably the required long-term option for the Indian FBRFC.34 If 
thorium is employed instead of depleted uranium in the blanket regions, the fissile 
material produced in the blanket regions will be 233U instead of 239Pu according to the 
reaction:  
UPaThnTh d
233
27,
233
min2.22,
233232 ),(  → → ββγ  
The 233U produced is always contaminated with 232U, which in turn decays to 
hard gamma emitting daughter products like 212Bi (γ = 0.7 to 1.6MeV) and 208Tl (γ = 
2.6MeV).  This material is self-protecting from non-proliferation point of view, as 
chemical separation of the 232U from the 233U is impossible.  
Diversion Scenarios Considered 
The PRAETOR is evaluated for several diversion scenarios. Four diversion 
scenarios related to a FRBFC facility are considered. Each diversion scenario is 
evaluated for the plutonium-uranium cycle and thorium-uranium cycle. Each diversion 
scenario is evaluated with two different sets of weights: uniform and survey-based. Each 
scenario is evaluated with risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior by the proliferator. To 
demonstrate the impact of safeguards in the analysis, each diversion scenario is 
evaluated first without safeguards and then a second time with full additional protocol 
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safeguards (See Ref. 27). Some attributes, such as “Is the additional protocol in force?” 
change from a utility value of zero to one. Others, such as “probability of detection by 
accountancy” were changed from a utility value of zero to 0.75. The attributes which are 
changed by the inclusion of safeguards are can be seen in the tables of inputs for each 
scenario, given in Appendix E. In each case, the material was taken from a different 
position and state in the FBRFC, but most other details were unaltered to prevent 
pathway bias. It was expected that the use of safeguards would enhance PR, as will the 
use of thorium. In all cases, the inputs for the material property attributes were provided 
by a recent report on fast reactor fuel nonproliferation characteristics.35 In order to 
benchmark and compare the PR of the components in the FBRFC to existing LWR 
cycles, a fifth diversion scenario based on a standard LWR PUREX plant diversion was 
calculated.  
The diversion scenarios have been designed to be as close to each other as 
possible to compare the relative risk of material within the FBRFC and between the U-
Pu and Th-U cycles. For example, in all diversion scenarios, the proliferator is assumed 
to transport the material by truck, helping to eliminate potential pathway bias in the 
analysis. In all diversion scenarios, the amount of material stolen is exactly one SQ of 
material. In all scenarios, after the material is diverted, it is transported by truck to a 
small PUREX reprocessing hot cell, where the plutonium is extracted. The plutonium is 
transformed into a metallic form and is used in conjunction with an implosion style 
package. 
46 
 
 
 
In the first scenario, it is assumed that the proliferator will remove 1159 
irradiated pins from the blanket assemblies after three cycles of operation. Blanket 
assemblies breed plutonium to its highest purity because of low burnup. This material is 
stolen by breaking the fuel-can under the sodium by remote manipulation, stealing a 
subset of pins, and then replacing rewelding the fuel-can to create a partial defect 
diversion. This material is taken from the spent fuel pool and replaced with depleted 
uranium. This diversion will be protracted, taken over a total of six cycles to evade the 
accounting systems. The following paragraphs explain the logic behind each of the 
attributes for the uranium-plutonium blanket material theft scenario. The attribute values 
for the uranium-thorium cycle of Scenario 1 and all attribute values for Scenarios 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 are presented in a set of tables in Appendix E. The diversion for Scenarios 1, 2, 
and 3, can be seen in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Diagram of Diversion from Fast Reactor  
 
 
The mass per blanket pin is 1.438 kg/pin, leading to a total diverted mass of 1666 
kg. The density of the blanket material is 11.0 g/cc, leading to a total diverted volume of 
0.151 m3. The proliferator will move this material into two 55 gallon drums with boron-
carbide sand. Six drums are used because of the protracted diversion, so the number of 
items per SQ is six. The material is a solid. The dose is 8.3 Sv/hr. The fuel will have a 
slow plastic interaction. The temperature of the source process will be 200 degrees C. It 
has a specific thermal power of 0.024343W/cc36.  
The uncertainty in accountancy measurements is difficult to estimate, and so a 
value of 0.5 SQ is assumed and will be used consistently for all scenarios. The difference 
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between expected and actual MUF should be zero, because the facility uses item 
accountancy. Because fuel on site contains unirradiated direct use material, the 
frequency for measurement is monthly. The facility is assumed to have a fresh load of 
fuel on site, and a single load of spent fuel on site, so the total amount of SQ available at 
the facility is 240 SQ.  
Blanket material is difficult to access. Furthermore, the assemblies are not 
reconstitutable because they are welded shut. The area does not have enough room to 
make the modifications and remote handling and specialized tools are required. It is 
assumed that the removal of the complicated welds inside of a fuel assembly, through 
the sodium by remote will require a team of ten technicians practicing for three years. 
The process of running the power plant does not need to be stopped because there are 
refueling times when the fuel is exposed. Since the material is expected to be handled 
exclusively remotely, the safety risk is low. The containment of the reactor is unlikely to 
be penetrated by the modifications.   
During the transportation stage, the physical characteristics of the fuel remain the 
same. The immediate chemical toxicity and time average chemical toxicity are 
negligible. The transportation containers (81.6 kg), added to 100 kg of boron-carbide 
sand, shielding, and fuel, has a total mass of 2176 kg, and a volume of 1.24 cubic meters. 
The shielding needed to reduce the radiation to 10mR/hr is 0.12 m, assuming that the 
shield is made out of lead. The host country size is the average of Japan, China, France, 
and India: 3475857 sq km. The number of host country nuclear facilities is assumed to 
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be 20. The IAEA imagery analysis rate utility value is assumed to be 0.75 as no function 
has been determined for this value. 
During the transformation stage, the number of steps to metallic form is 6: 
chop/shear dissolving, fission product removal, U/Pu separation, Pu purification, and 
conversion to metallic form. The number of steps is used as a surrogate to the utility 
function “Money required for transformation.” The amount of export controlled 
equipment is 7: solvent extractors, chemical holding tanks, especially designed systems 
for production of Pu metal, high-density radiation shielding windows, radiation-
hardened cameras, robots, and remote manipulators. The electrical demand would be 
low, roughly 2 MWe, as assumed by Giannangeli. It is assumed that a small hot cell 
must have been constructed, requiring 20 unskilled laborers for a year. A team of four 
handy-man technicians is assumed, as well as two chemical engineers, a mechanical 
engineer, and a nuclear engineer, all for three months. A specialist in Pu metallurgy, and 
a specialist chemical engineer in separations technology are both needed for three 
months.  
Assume the environmental sampling rate is ever day, and the samples are stored 
until a need to test arises. The isotopic signatures released by this transformation work 
are fission gases, plutonium, and depleted uranium. The facility could be reasonably 
small, in the area of 1000 sq m.  The heat load would be negligible, as would the sonic 
load, though the radiation load would be 3.6 Sv/hr. Because the proliferator has 
commercial experience with reprocessing Pu, the liquid and gas emissions would be 
close to zero.       
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The material would have a spontaneous neutron generation rate of 0.22 n/s-g37, 
which is low because of the weapons-grade plutonium. The radiation exposure at 1 
meter would be negligible. The heating rate would be 22.3W/kg, low because of the high 
purity of the fuel. Ballistic assembly methods are not possible. There are 7 phases in the 
phase diagram, and Giannangeli’s utility function is used as a surrogate for phase 
stability because it provides the right resultsvi. The dose level would be negligible, the 
material would be slowly reactive with air. The radiotoxicity is found by using the ratio 
of the types of plutonium. This blanket material is 98% 239Pu, 1.9% 240Pu, and 0.04% 
98% 241Pu leading to a radiotoxicity of utility of 0.754. Finally, the knowledge and skills  
required for weapon fabrication are unknown to the author, and this utility value has 
been assumed as 0.5. The uranium-thorium cycle is very similar because the blanket 
material in the uranium-thorium cycle is still depleted uranium. The change in the 
energy spectrum from the use of thorium for the fast reactor is not significant enough to 
change the isotopic vector in the blanket fuel, and this research considers the two cases 
indistinguishable.  
Scenario 2 is very similar to Scenario 1, except that 142 fresh fuel pins are 
removed from the outer core assembly of a fast reactor fuels storage area and replaced 
with depleted uranium. In this scenario, the fuel-can is broken and the partial defect 
created while the fresh fuel is under the liquid sodium, before it has entered the reactor 
core. The uranium-thorium cycle is very similar to the uranium-plutonium cycle because 
                                                 
vi
 The Giannangeli function of number of phases happens to correlate closely with phase stability for 
uranium, plutonium, and neptunium (the three most likely weapon candidates).  
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the amount of plutonium per gram of material is the same and the radioactive and 
chemical properties of thorium are sufficiently similar to depleted uranium that a large 
overall impact is not expected by the change. As a result, this research considers the 
thorium case for spent fuel to be indistinguishable. The Fresh Fuel diversion scenario is 
characterized by the high plutonium density in the material stolen compared to the 
blanket, but lower plutonium quality overall. Like the blanket, fresh fuel has very little 
dose and is expected to have the least PR of all evaluations. 
Scenario 3 is very similar to the Scenario 2, except that 165 spent fuel pins are 
removed from the outer core assembly of a fast reactor fuels storage area and replaced 
with depleted uranium. There are three versions of Scenario 3: uranium-plutonium cycle, 
uranium-thorium cycle with thorium pins in an outer ring of each assembly around 
uranium-plutonium pins, and uranium-thorium in which the thorium is mixed-in 
uniformly with all pins such that each pin is a Th-U-Pu pin. Before the material is pulled 
from the sodium and canned for transportation or storage but after it has been removed 
from temporary storage in the reactor, the fuel-can is broken, material stolen, and then 
rewelded. In the first uranium-thorium cycle analysis, the thorium-plutonium pins ring 
the outside of the fuel assemblies. The uranium-plutonium pins are diverted 
preferentially, and the plutonium is to be turned into a weapon. That means that the fuel-
can must be partially diverted in such a way to remove the inner fuel pins, requiring an 
ability to choose which pins are diverted. The second uranium-thorium version does not 
have preferential pin stealing, since all pins are the same. This regardless of cycle, this 
scenario includes material with more intrinsic PR (traditionally) than the blanket and 
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fresh fuel cases because of the self protection, easy detectability (especially for the 
uranium-thorium cycle), and plutonium poorly-suited to weapons fabrication (especially 
for the uranium-plutonium cycle). However, the plutonium density is still high and so 
may not match the PR of the more diffuse LWR-PUREX scenario, described below. It is 
believed that if thorium is distributed equally in the spent fuel instead of at the periphery, 
the high-energy gamma fission products would lead to a higher probability of detection, 
higher dose, more shielding, mass, volume, and consequently a higher PR value. 
In Scenario 4, the same spent fuel described in Scenario 3 is stolen after it has 
been chopped and dissolved in the mixing tank after the fission products have been 
removed in a reprocessing facility. This is very similar to the test case presented by 
Giannangeli, except the input material to the PUREX process is FBR spent fuel. This 
scenario will likely see the impact from the inclusion of thorium similar to the second 
version of the uranium-thorium cycle diversion, above, because of the mixing of the U-
232 daughter products (built in from irradiation of Th-232). These daughters have 
strong, high energy gammas which is one of the primary advantages (from a PR 
standpoint) of the uranium-thorium cycle.  
Finally, in Scenario 5, material is stolen immediately after the fission products 
are removed from a small commercial reprocessing facility. The feed material for the 
reprocessing plant is PWR spent fuel (50,000 MWD/MTU). This scenario is taken 
directly from Giannangeli.  
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results 
The PRs given by PRAETOR for the scenarios is presented below as Table 3. 
The percent differences between the uniform and expert weights are given in Table 4. 
The percent differences of the PRs in relation to the LWR-PUREX scenario are given as 
Table 5. The highest PR evaluated was the homogenous-thorium spent fuel; the lowest 
PR was the uranium-plutonium fresh fuel. The results are published on the following 
pages. 
Discussion 
The scenarios resulted in similar PR, which was expected because of the very 
similar diversion paths identified. However, there are several observations that can be 
drawn from these evaluations related to safeguards, fast reactors in general, the uranium-
plutonium cycle versus the thorium-uranium cycle, and the weighting structure. 
First, it is observed that within the PRAETOR method that safeguards have a 
very significant impact on the PR of a facility. In the risk-seeking approach, the use of 
safeguards resulted in a minimum increase in PR of 55%. In the risk-averse approach, 
safeguards increase the overall PR by 35% in every case. This is a very large 
improvement given the sensitivity to PRAETOR and lack of “redeeming qualities.” The 
difference in fuel type does not have nearly the impact of safeguards, excepting the 
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change to fresh fuel, which is of comparable impact. Safeguards have special importance 
with respect to fast reactors. When using expert weights, most cases in the FBRFC 
(according to the PRAETOR) except fresh fuel have PR comparable to the LWR-
PUREX diversion case if safeguards are applied.  
The PRAETOR analysis of the FBRFC shows PR values which are smaller than 
an LWR-PUREX facility. The reactor complex of the FBRFC is lower in PR because of 
the high plutonium-density. The PUREX(U-Pu) case has roughly 1/4 of the dose from 
the slurry of uranium and higher actinides than the LWR-PUREX case. Because of the 
aforementioned enhanced effect of safeguards on the FBRFC, however, it appears that 
there is potential for the FBRFC to be comparable to the LWR cycle. Even with 
significant safeguards applied, however, the fresh fuel scenario still had much lower PR.  
The fresh fuel is the weak link in the chain. It is suggested that that actions 
should be taken to increase the detection of fresh fuel manipulation and decrease the 
attractiveness of the material in fresh fuel. It may also require more containment and 
surveillance to increase the detection by the IAEA of covert manipulation to gain enough 
PR. Examples include doping the fresh fuel plutonium with more 238Pu or transuranics to 
increase the neutrons per second emitted, specific heat from the fuel, and dose.   
The addition of thorium to the fuel cycle did not increase the PR value obtained by the 
PRAETOR overall as was originally expected. In the case that the thorium was separate 
from the uranium in the assemblies (Scenario 3, uranium-thorium cycle, version 1), the 
PR of the spent fuel dropped because thorium affected the energy-spectrum enough that 
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the uranium-plutonium pins did not produce as many strong gamma-releasing fission 
products. This led to less shielding needed, which requires less mass and less volume, 
two of the attributes identified as much more important in the expert case. When the 
thorium was mixed uniformly in the fuel pins, the resulting material was more 
detectable, required more shielding (due to the 2.6 MeV photons) and therefore mass and 
volume during transportation. However, the inclusion of thorium meant that less U-235 
was present in the fuel, leading to a lower concentration of Pu-238, the main 
contribution to the heating rate and spontaneous neutron generation in the weapon. 
While the mixing may have increased the detectability and shielding required, both of 
these attributes were already reasonably high, and the decrease in heating rate and 
weaponization difficulty resulted in a PR which was higher, but not as high as expected. 
This carries over into the PUREX case, in which the PR did increase for stealing the 
material while it is being processed because the high-energy gamma emitting products 
from thorium were mixed in universally with the other fuel, even with a lower heating 
rate and easier weaponization. This increase in PR corroborates with the hypothesis that 
thorium can increase the PR of a fuel cycle, but the increase was not as significant as 
hoped-for. As current, the author is unaware of any successful cores in which thorium is 
mixed uniformly in an FBR core. This would require a higher plutonium density to 
compensate for the poorer neutronics of thorium, which could reduce PR, and so an 
absolute conclusion cannot yet be determined regarding that thorium cycle.  
The expert weights gave different results than the uniform weights. In some cases 
(Blanket, Fresh Fuel, Spent Fuel), expert weights raised the PR values for the no 
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safeguards cases. In other cases (PUREX, PUREX-LWR) the PR was reduced by the 
expert weights. In both cases when safeguards were applied, the PRAETOR reported 
higher values than uniform weighting. This is expected because safeguards were rated 
very highly by experts.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
FUTURE WORK 
While the PRAETOR is an improvement over the previous PR analyses by 
Giannangeli and SAPRA, there is significant future work which can improve upon the 
remaining limitations of PRAETOR. Some utility functions still need to be added and all 
other utility functions need to be evaluated by survey rather than individual analyst 
opinions. Future risk considerations may require designing PRAETOR to iterate on PR 
to resolve enemy intent if it moves from risk-seeking to risk-averse. As current, the 
method of assigning the probability of detection by safeguards measures is inadequate. 
Some attributes may be combined with others to ensure all attributes are completely 
independent and others are difficult to quantify. The future evaluations on the thorium-
uranium cycle may provide more insight. Finally, the change in PR between expert and 
uniform weights will be explained. 
Updating Utility Functions 
Some of the attributes recommended were not able to be included because the 
information needed to create an appropriate utility value was not available (See Ref 27). 
These two attributes “Money required for transformation” and “Phase stability” instead 
required the surrogates “Number of steps in transformation” and “Number of phases.” 
Future work must find a way to evaluate these attributes or generate the appropriate 
utility functions. 
60 
 
 
 
All of the utility functioned used in this analysis come from a single analyst or 
small group of analysts considering individual functions. As a result, the PRAETOR 
final analysis still has some of the fundamental flaws with its predecessor, SAPRA. The 
use of a survey to generate the new weighting structure is an excellent model that should 
be followed for the complete reevaluation of all of the utility functions, including the 
functions described in this paper. Once the appropriate utility functions have been 
determined by large survey, the evaluations given by PRAETOR will be more thorough, 
accurate, and less resource intensive. This combination will ensure that it is the best 
available PR method available.  
Proliferator Risk Perception Changes 
As current, PRAETOR can handle risk perception for probability of detections of 
any type, but the ability for PRAETOR to handle the overall risk behavior by the enemy 
is limited. This is because the enemy intent and risk are not known a priori. At this time, 
PRAETOR assumes a general risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior. If the system iterates 
with enemy intent until the system converges, the system will gain the ability to have 
any continuous function of enemy risk behavior. Designing this system iteration and 
determining the appropriate enemy risk behavior for specific threats is left for future 
work.  
Furthermore, the program is fundamentally written from the perspective of the 
operator. The survey presented asked for what barriers are most important assuming a 
linear increase in proliferation difficulty per resources spent. This is subtly different 
from asking the experts which barriers they would be most frustrated with if they were 
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the proliferator. Future surveys to adjust the risk-perception may need to have a change 
of language to ensure that the (perception of the) proliferator’s viewpoint is dominate so 
the PRAETOR can effectively apply his/her risk-behavior. 
Tradeoff Between Safeguards Attributes 
The PRAETOR relies on an external analysis of the accountancy system, IAEA 
inspections, and process monitoring of a facility. This can cause some difficulty because 
some actions which naturally lend themselves to lower PR can appear to lead to higher 
PR. For example, the scenarios described previously stole material over six cycles, 
meaning the number of items stolen was six. If the scenarios would have assumed that it 
was an abrupt diversion, the PR would have actually decreased, even though an abrupt 
diversion of half of the core is more likely to be noticed by the accountancy system. The 
interdependence of these variables could be solved by determining the probability of 
detection as a function of items stolen, leading to a more complex items-stolen utility 
function. 
Combination of Attributes 
Several of the attributes are still interdependent as mentioned by the specific 
example above. This may be because several of the attributes are actually dependent on 
underlying fundamentals which have not yet been identified. In the future, a mapping of 
interdependencies could reduce the number of attributes. The survey-based weights 
should have helped alleviate this interdependence, but because of the anchoring heuristic 
(See Appendix A), it is unlikely that it solved the problem.  
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Quantification of Remaining Attributes 
Some attributes may need to be excluded because they cannot be quantified 
without exceptionally good knowledge. The previously given example of an excluded 
attribute, “money required for transformation,”  is highly dependent on the attitudes of 
the proliferator, access to technology, and intelligence information. It is unlikely that an 
appropriate value can be found for the utility value easily. Therefore, if this value cannot 
be determined, it should be removed and replaced with the aforementioned surrogate.  
New Thorium Cycle Evaluations 
The evaluated thorium cycle assumed that the proliferator trained for years to 
perform remote manipulation welds. Other pathways such as the theft of a single 
assembly represent less time-intensive work, and so future work should consider even 
more pathways from which to divert from the FBRFC. Additionally, the FBRFC could 
be changed such that thorium is distributed in the reactor evenly and the entire cycle 
revaluated.  
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND REVIEW 
Though significant work remains in the future for updating the new tool, 
PRAETOR, an excellent start has been made in the way of objective, repeatable, and 
realistic PR assessment. This tool was built because there is a serious need for an 
appropriate measure of relative risk. Previous tools and methods often required 
expensive expert elicitation or assumed linearity in the path to diversion. Instead, this 
tool was built on the previous work of SAPRA and Giannangeli’s method, strong 
foundations from which more advanced techniques could be built.   The techniques were 
updated and added-to; new weights were determined by expert survey and new 
approaches involving risk-behavior were applied. The new tool’s sensitivity to each 
attribute of PR was found, and paradigm cases were considered with both expert and  
nonexpert weights. The FBRFC was described and then the specific attempts to divert 
material through the fuel cycle were explained. These scenarios were tested with 
PRAETOR against an LWR-PUREX example diversion. The earlier belief that thorium 
would increase the PR was refuted by the analysis of the PRAETOR tool. However, 
safeguards had a significant impact in the PR. The PRAETOR analysis suggests that 
FBRFC has the potential to have comparable PR in all cases with the application of 
safeguards except fresh fuel, which will require material adjustments or other measures 
to this part of the fuel cycle to gain enough PR to be of comparable risk. Part of this  
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evaluation was based on only a few analysts’ assumptions in the utility functions, and so 
there is a clear path forward for how the method might be improved. There is room for 
improvement in clarifying attributes and streamlining the method, but this work has built 
the first stories on the foundation.  
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APPENDIX A 
RISK PRIMER 
Risk is a large topic on which volumes can be found easily in the literature. It is 
an aggregate of the total expected gain or loss for a given set of time, events, 
opportunities, or items. Perception of risk is as important as the actual risk. This requires 
assumptions regarding the risk behavior of the proliferator. This work makes several 
assumptions regarding risk and its correlation to multi-attribute utility theory.  
Definition of Risk 38 39 
Risk is an inherently scientific quantity based on a set of known parameters. Risk 
is defined as the expected value from a set of discrete events or time if the events occur 
regularly and quickly, often normalized between zero and one. The definition used in 
this work is that riskvii is the threat multiplied by the consequences. The threat can be 
further broken down into two components which are multiplied together, vulnerability 
and enemy intent40. Consequences are the negative effects of an event, should it occur. 
Enemy intent is how likely an attack is to occur or how many resources the enemy can 
be expected to apply to a particular vulnerability. Vulnerability is the probability of 
success of an attack, should an attack occur. Risk methodologies, if applied with a large 
set of data, provide the optimum allocation of resources against a non-thinking enemy. 
Further refinement of risk methods with game theory can create optimum resource 
                                                 
vii
 Risk = Consequences  X Vulnerability X Enemy Intent 
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allocation against a perfectly logical enemy, and perturbation theory of risk analysis can 
create resource allocation very close to optimum.41  
Perception of Risk 42 43 44 viii 
All of these models also rely on an assumption that the amount of resources that 
are willing to be spent matches linearly with the amount of risk. This condition, called 
risk neutrality, requires that resources are allocated directly proportionally to the amount 
of risk. A willingness to spend more resources to avoid risk is to be risk-averse; 
spending fewer resources on the same amount of risk is risk-seeking. Figure 14 
demonstrates this graphically. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
viii
 This section borrows heavily from Ref. 41. 
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Figure 15: Risk Behavior Presented Graphically 
 
 
It has been demonstrated that people are not perfectly logical and often make 
choices which are drastically different from risk-neutrality. For example, a person may 
be seen as reasonable not to smoke for health reasons but still refuse to wear a seatbelt, 
even though one behavior is risk-averse (not smoking) and one is highly risk-seeking 
(not wearing a seat-belt). It has been determined that, on average, Americans have 
roughly a hundred times more tolerance for risks that they choose or control over risks in 
which they have no choice or do not control. They also have significantly more tolerance 
for risks that they understand compared to risks that they do not understand 45 46. It has 
been shown that even though the risk may not change, the actual events which occur 
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tend to affect the perception of the risk47. Events that have not occurred are seen as less 
likely, while events that have occurred are considered much more likely.  
Enemy Intent and Vulnerability  
Because the enemy has choices and can make rational decisions, it is clear that 
enemy intent is correlated to the vulnerability; it is less likely that an enemy will attack a 
hardened target compared to a lower risk target. The psychology of risk, especially with 
regard to terrorists and nation-states is an entire field unto itself, and as a result, several 
assumptions have been made in past analyses. It has been assumed in the past that the 
enemy intent does not change with respect to vulnerability (threat is often assumed to be 
unity), meaning the risk is correlated directly to vulnerability. It has also been assumed 
that enemy intent is linear to perceived vulnerability and therefore correlated to 
vulnerability, which implies that risk is correlated to the square of the vulnerability.  
This work makes three assumptions when considering enemy intent in the relative risk:  
• Evaluations of probabilities of being caught follow traditional high-stakes 
gambling behavior. This is consistent with Prospect Theory in which the 
proliferator is very risk-seeking at low risk, but very risk-averse at high risk [Ref 
28]. 
• The overall risk-neutrality of the enemy is always risk-seeking or risk-averse 
because a shift in behavior would require significant iteration on the values. The 
risk neutrality is controlled by a single variable, as explained in Appendix B. 
• Perceived vulnerability is the same as vulnerability.  
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APPENDIX B 
MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY ANALYSIS 
Introduction  
This work uses the MAUA methodology to embed quantitative and qualitative 
elements of PR assessment. The quantitative attributes, such as mass per significant 
quantity or dose rate, are translated to numerical values as inputs and dependencies 
through so-called utility functions, normalized between zero and one. However, the 
relative importance assigned to these utility functions in the form of weights is usually 
qualitative. Two different weighting schemes are used in the present work, one based on 
expert surveys, and another a uniform weighting scheme. The MAUA methodology’s 
limits are related to the requirement of a strong investment in time and resources for the 
definition, verification and implementation of the utility functions. However, the 
specificity, updatability, and transparency of the MAUA method make it a good 
candidate for this work.  
MAUA Theory 
The MAUA is a well-established decision analysis methodology and has evolved 
since its first publication in 1978.48 The MAUA method has been applied, for example, 
in air defense49, bridge construction and strengthening50, electronic commerce 
architecture51, and house value evaluation52. In order for analysts to maximize their 
benefit, utility functions were created that can ultimately compare competing values. 
MAUA consists of several methods of compiling multiple factors in order to make a 
single decision. Because there are several methods, MAUA analysis ranges from simple 
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weighted addition and multiplication to algorithms of sufficient complexity that high end 
computing is required. Attribute values, scaled into utility values, aid in ascertaining 
conclusions regarding the possibility of success at a given rate under certain conditions 
of risk. These utility values are used in composite or weighted form to make a final 
assessment. This final, weighted form is the ultimate goal of any MAUA method, a 
utility function that consists of multiple attributes which best describe the attractiveness 
of a system. The best decision, obviously, is one which maximizes the value of the 
function. The various steps involved in the MAUA assessment are: 
• Define utility function u(x1, x2,…..xi) to represent value of a given path for a range of 
attribute values xi; 
• Define the single-attribute utility functions ui (xi), that describe this overall utility; 
• Define a set of attributes, {xi}, that can be related to cost, time, material quality, or 
other characteristics deemed of value or utility; 
• Apply these attributes and utility functions into a MAUA weighting scheme. 
Differences between MAUA analyses include the use of different weighting 
schemes, the use of various utility functions, and the selection of different attributes for 
inclusion. Three equations are shown below to illustrate the differences between MAUA 
methods. In all equations, u is the normalized utility value between zero and one where 
zero indicates no benefit and one represents maximum benefit, the ki values are weights, 
between zero and one, determined by the analyst, ui(xi), is a utility function for a single 
attribute, the x values are attributes which feed into the utility functions and the K value 
is determined by the normalizing condition (Eq 8) of the function. The general form of 
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the MAUA is shown as Eq 5. If K is assigned to zero, the additive MAUA is created.  
Additive MAUA (Eq. 6) is limited because as the utility of an attribute goes to zero there 
may be little impact in the final result, depending on the weight assigned to any given 
utility. Adding many factors with low sensitivity in additive MAUA will tend to make 
the entire method less sensitive due to its additive (averaging) nature and subsequently 
will give less pertinent information. As a result, an adaptation of the multiplicative 
MAUA has been chosen (Eq. 7). Equation 7 contains some positive features of the 
additive model, such as the ability for more attributes and dampening the effect of any 
given attribute. Additionally, Eq. 7 can still be readily understood, is computationally 
inexpensive, and still reduces a complex set of knowledge to a single metric. This single 
metric is a synthesis of the technical information in terms that are easily communicated 
to workers in non-technical fields, e.g., policy makers. However, the repeated use of 
similar risk-behavior in the adapted multiplicative method can push results to either zero 
or one. Because of this phenomenon, the additive model is used in all tiers except the 
final tier. This allows for the use of risk by the multiplicative method while allowing 
multi-layer analysis. 
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iKkK )1(1  (8) 
In order to apply our preferred multiplicative form (Eq. 7), there are at least three 
additional requirements. First, the sum of all the weighting factors ki must not be exactly 
1, because that would reduce the equation to the additive MAUA function. So the sum of 
all weighting factors (ki) will be selected as different than 1. Second, the weighting 
factors cannot each be equal to 1. If they were, then the only solutions to Eq. 8 would be 
K = -1 and K = 0, neither of which are valid. Third, K must be positive when 1
1
<∑
n
ik  
(the multi-attribute utility function exhibits risk-aversion).  If
 
1
1
>∑
n
ik , the multi-
attribute utility function exhibits risk-seeking, and hence is not used. These points are 
illustrated graphically in Fig 15, where 10 attributes, with equal weights ki and utility 
values ui are employed.  In one case, the sum of the weights is equal to 2, resulting in 
higher values for the final utility (hence being risk-seeking). In the other case, the sum of 
the weights is equal to 0.5, leading to a lower value, hence being risk-averse. The x-axis 
in the figure represents the constant ui values chosen for the 10 attributes in this 
example. 
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Figure 16. Risk-Seeking vs Risk-Averse Behavior.  
 
 
The solution to find K in the range 0 < K for the normalizing condition in Eq 4 
for a typical case is demonstrated in Figure 16. In this case, 10 attributes xi of equal 
weights ki (i=1, 10) with 
1
0 .5
n
ik =∑  are assumed for the utility function representing a 
particular path in the system. 
83 
 
 
 
  
Figure 17. Valid K Solution for Ten Equal Weights of k=0.5 
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The answers from a utility analysis can be fed into a second tier analysis, leading 
to a multi-tiered MAUA seamlessly. Multiple layers based on different levels of 
resolution allow the MAUA methodology to scale from the individual concepts to 
systems level analysis. This is used, for instance, to perform a MAUA over the relative 
risk in diversion of material, and then use the diversion value in conjunction to the 
transportation, transformation, and weaponization values to determine the final relative 
PR value. An example of a two stage MAUA is shown as Eq. 9, in which the first stage 
values are indicated by the subscript i and the second stage values are indicated by the 
subscript j.  
2 1 2 2
( (1 ( ))) 1
1 ( , ... ) 1 ( )
n
i i im
i
overall i j
j
Kk u x
K u x x x K k
K
 
+ − 
 + = +
 
  
∏
∏   (9) 
No MAUA analysis should be taken at face value without a careful consideration 
for the specific attributes, weights, and utility functions applied. However, a standard set 
of attributes, weights, and utility functions, once determined, will render an objective, 
repeatable, and information driven decision.  
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY RESULTS AND WRONG WEIGHTS 
Outline of Results 
 The final weights, their standard deviations, and results from the two-sided 
student-t test are shown in the following sections: Expert, Non-expert, and Mixed Group. 
Each section contains an overview of the results followed by a table of the full results. In 
each section, only results at a confidence of 95% (p=0.95) and higher are explicitly 
mentioned. In each table, each of the three tiers are shown, their final weight according 
to the survey weights, the sample deviation, and the probability that there is a difference 
between the uniform weight value and the true value as believed by the respondent 
group.  
Expert Group 
The expert group showed the highest amount of correlation in their responses, 
and many of their response differed from the uniform weights case. The diversion stage 
is regarded as 33.0% more important than the original weight assigned in the uniform 
case at a confidence of p=0.999. Transportation is 25.6% less important at confidence of 
p=0.999. Transformation is 10.7% more important at a confidence of p=0.98 while 
weaponization is 10.8% less important at the same confidence.  These results follows 
traditional nonproliferation teaching that diversion is the most important aspect to 
consider in PR analyses, smuggling networks make transportation easy, transformation 
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has significant technical challenges, and since the weaponization must be assumed 
whenever performing an analysis. 
Second tier utilities still had significant differences from uniform. The materials 
control and accountability system was 19.1% more important at a confidence of 
p=0.999. The difficulty in making facility modifications was 6.0% less important at 
p=0.95, and the process monitoring systems were 23.0% less important at a confidence 
of p=0.98. Second tier uniform weighting is prevalent until the handling difficulties 
during the weaponization stage is  seen as 17.5% less important but the knowledge and 
skills needed to fabricate the device is 19.0% more important, both at confidence p=0.99.  
Several individual attribute differences are significant. The material form is 
35.7% less important at p=0.98, while the radiation dose is 48.9% more important at 
p=0.99. Chemical reactivity is 57.2% less important at p=0.98. Export equipment was 
14.4% more important at p=0.999, and skilled workers are 9.2% more important at the 
same confidence. The heating rate was 31.6% less important at p=0.99. Radiotoxicity 
was also 7.8% less important at p=0.98. Many of the attributes showed changes at 
confidence of p=0.90, indicating a need for a larger sample. Because the expert group 
was very small (n=11), few outlier removals could be justified leading to a decrease in 
resolution of the data.    
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Table 6: Weight Results for Experts 
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Table 6: Continued 
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Table 6: Continued 
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Table 6: Continued 
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Non-Expert Group 
The non-expert group showed less correlation than the expert group. The 
diversion stage is not resolved differently at the p=0.95 confidence, though does show a 
17.6% increase at the p=0.90 confidence level. Transportation is 19.1% less important 
than uniform weights at p=0.99. Transformation cannot be resolved at any reasonable 
confidence. Weaponization can be resolved at the p=0.90 confidence level to be 14.3% 
less important than uniform weights.  
The second tier had few resolved differences from uniform. Material handling 
during transportation is 13.8% less important and evading detection during transport is 
10.8% more important (both at p=0.98). The equipment needed during the 
transformation process is 17.0% more important at p=0.98 while the workforce is 13.3% 
less important.  
The individual attributes showed few differences, especially when compared to 
the expert group. Temperature of the source process is 28.7% less important at p=0.99. 
Expected vs actual material unaccounted for is 14.5% less important at p=0.98. 
Immediate chemical toxicity is 19.1% more important at p=0.97. At the same 
confidence, shield thickness is 15.4% more important. At p=0.99, Unskilled labor is 
51.0% less important, skilled labor is 38.0% less important, but technical expert work is 
73.7% more important. Isotopic signatures released from the transformation process are 
25.0% more important at p=0.97. The heat and sonic loads are 17.3% and 31.2% less 
important respectively at p=0.97.  
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Table 7: Weight Results for Non Experts 
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Table 7: Continued  
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Table 7: Continued  
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Table 7: Continued  
 
 
 
Mixed Group 
With experts and non-experts combined, there are some clear differences 
between uniform weights and non-uniform weights. The diversion stage was regarded as 
27.2% more important than the original diversion weight assigned by uniform weights at 
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a confidence of p=0.999. Transportation was 20.4% less important than the original 
value under uniform weights at a confidence of p=0.999. Transformation was 8.8% more 
important at a confidence of p=0.95. Weaponization was 11.6% less important at a 
confidence of p=0.95. This follows traditional nonproliferation teaching that diversion is 
the most important aspect to consider in PR analyses, smuggling networks make 
transportation easy, transformation has significant technical challenges, and 
weaponization must be assumed whenever performing an analysis.  
At a required confidence of p=0.95, very few second tier values can be 
determined to different from uniform. The difficulty of evading the material control 
system was determined to be 15.0% more important, and the difficulty of evading off-
normal detection systems was found to be 14% less important than assigned from 
uniform weights. These show that the mixed group relies on materials control and 
accountability, which has traditionally been the workhorse of nonproliferation, and 
places much lower emphasis on the newer technology of process monitoring. The 
facilities and equipment needed during the transformation stage was determined to be 
11.7% more important. The knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate the 
weapon was 17.7% more important compared to the uniform case.  
Individual attributes that distinguished themselves at the p=0.95 confidence level 
were found mostly in two categories: evading detection during the transformation, and 
the required workers during transformation. The notable exception was the temperature 
of the source process during the diversion stage which was regarded as less important 
(44.2%). During the transformation stage, isotopic signatures were regarded as 
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significantly more important (29%), while the head and sonic loads were significantly 
less important (21% and 33%, respectively). Unskilled and low skill workers were 
considered very less important (50.8% and 30.8%), while high and very highly skilled 
workers were considered extremely important (16.4% and 65.2%). It is clear that the 
mixed community regards requirements for expertise as a possibly very strong barrier to 
proliferation.  
The differences between the expert and non-expert groups can be significant. 
They range from 0.2% for knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate a weapon 
to 88.62% regarding chemical reactivity. The diversion stage is regarded as more 
important to experts than non-experts, which corroborates with the traditional training 
that diversion is the most important step. Experts favored mass, volume, and radiation 
dose heavily (25% or more over non-experts) through the entire survey, and tended to 
ignore heat load, chemistry, non-nuclear signatures, and newer technologies such as 
process monitoring. Experts also had a much higher regard for material unaccounted for, 
which may indicate that the phrasing of that attribute needs to be reworked because non-
experts do not recognize the connotation associated with that phrase. Many attributes 
which require special training to understand their significance are regarded more highly 
by experts than non-experts. For example, phases in the phase diagram, which affects the 
reliability of weapons, was rated low by non-experts but very high by non-experts. The 
following table shows the full results if non-experts and experts are taken as a single 
group, including the percent difference between experts and non-experts.  
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Table 8: Weight Results for Experts and Non-Experts Combined 
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Table 8: Continued 
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APPENDIX D 
SENSITIVITY GRAPHS 
The sensitivity of the overall PR value to changes in individual utility values has 
been determined. Of the 63 attributes in the PRAETOR, 50 are continuous functions. 
The excluded functions are: nuclear material form during diversion, chemical reactivity, 
the binary option regarding if there is enough space to make physical modifications, the 
binary option regarding a requirement for remote handling tools, the binary option 
regarding a requirement for specialized tools, a binary option regarding the requirement 
for active processes in a facility to be stopped, the material form during transportation,  
chemical reactivity during transportation, the number of steps to metallic form, a binary 
option regarding the enforcement of the Additional Protocol, a binary option regarding 
the use of ballistic assembly methods, the number of phases in the metal phase diagram, 
and the chemical reactivity during the weaponization of the material.  
The sensitivity of the overall PR value to individual utilities was determined for a 
high PR case and low PR case. The base values for the high PR case were taken from the 
highest evaluated PR value presented in this paper: a theft of spent fuel from the  
uranium-plutonium fast reactor under full IAEA safeguards including the Additional 
Protocol (See Ref. 27). The base values for the low PR case were taken from the lowest 
evaluated PR values presented in this paper: theft of fresh fuel from an unsafeguarded 
uranium-plutonium fast reactor. Each continuous function was first evaluated at a utility 
value of zero as a calibration point. The function was then evaluated at fifty different, 
but equidistant, utility values between zero and one.  The following pages contain the 
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graphs of the impacts of the continuous functions. The first graph, Fig. 17, contains the 
first five attributes in the diversion stage for the low PR case. The second graph, Fig. 18, 
contains the next five and Fig. 19 contains the remaining six in the diversion stage. The 
next three figures, Figs. 20, 21, and 22 are the same attributes for the high PR case. In all 
graphs in this section, the abscissa is the range of the utility value for a given attribute 
and the ordinate is the change in the overall utility. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. First Five Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the Low PR Case, Under 
“Material Handling During Diversion.” 
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Figure 19. Second Five Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the Low PR Case. 
 
 
  
Figure 20. Remaining Six Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the Low PR Case.  
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Figure 21. Five Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the High PR Case, Under 
“Material Handling During Diversion.” 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Second Five Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the High PR Case. 
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Figure 23. Remaining Six Attributes of the Diversion Stage for the High PR Case.  
 
 
Below are Figs. 23, 24, and 25, which contain the impact of all transportation 
utility values for the low PR case. The next three figures, Figs. 26, 27, and 28 are the 
same attributes for the high PR case.  
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Figure 24. First Five Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the Low PR Case. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Second Five Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the Low PR 
Case. 
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Figure 26. Remaining Six Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the Low PR 
Case. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Five Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the High PR Case. 
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Figure 28. Second Five Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the High PR 
Case. 
 
  
Figure 29. Remaining Six Attributes of the Transportation Stage for the High PR 
Case. 
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The final high PR value sensitivity to utility functions in the transformation stage 
is shown below in Figs. 29, 30, and 31.  The next three figures, Figs. 32, 33, and 34 are 
the same attributes for the high PR case.   
 
 
 
Figure 30. First Five Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the Low PR Case. 
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Figure 31. Second Five Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the Low PR 
Case. 
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Figure 32. Remaining Six Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the Low PR 
Case. 
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Figure 33. Five Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the High PR Case.  
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Figure 34. Second Five Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the High PR 
Case. 
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Figure 35. Remaining Six Attributes of the Transformation Stage for the High PR 
Case. 
 
Finally, the weaponization stage is presented in Figs. 35 for the low PR case and 
36 for the high PR case.  
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Figure 36. Attributes of the Weaponization Stage for the Low PR Case.  
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Figure 37. Attributes of the Weaponization Stage for the High PR Case.  
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APPENDIX E 
SCENARIO INPUTS 
The following tables are the inputs determined by Scenarios 1-5 presented under 
the heading “Scenarios Considered.”  Table 9 gives the inputs for the blanket assembly 
diversion case. Table 10 gives the inputs for the fresh fuel assembly. Table 11 gives the 
inputs for the spent fuel assembly for both uranium-plutonium and thorium-uranium 
cycles. Table 12 gives the inputs for the PUREX theft from the FBRFC while Table 13 
shows the PUREX diversion of LWR fuel. Table 14 is the naked plutonium sphere. 
Table 15 is the in-reactor diversion. Table 16 is the natural uranium case. 
 
 Table 9: Scenario Inputs for Blanket Assembly Diversion 
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Table 9: Continued 
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Table 10: Scenario Inputs for Fresh Fuel Assembly Diversion 
 
  Fresh Fuel Assembly 
  Uranium 
  Safeguards 
No 
Safeguards 
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  38 38 
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  0.00343 0.00343 
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ 6 6 
1.1.4. Material Form  solid solid 
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose  3.40E-06 0.0000034 
1.1.6. Chemical reactivity  SlowPlastic SlowPlastic 
1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process  200 200 
1.1.8. Heat load of material  0.0058 0.0058 
1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements  0.5 1 
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Table 10: Continued  
Fresh Fuel Assembly 
  Uranium 
  Safeguards 
No 
Safeguards 
    
1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF 0 1 
1.2.3. Frequency of measurement monthly never 
1.2.4 Amount of Material Available 240 240 
1.3.1. Probability of detection 0.75 0 
1.4.1 
Is there enough physical space to make 
modifications 0 0 
1.4.2 Number of People for Modifications 30 30 
1.4.3 Remote handling tools required? 1 1 
1.4.4 Specialized tools required? 1 1 
1.4.5 
Requirement for the process to be halted for 
modifications 0 0 
1.4.6 Risk of Modification (safety) 0 0 
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment 0 0 
1.5.1 Probability of being caught 0.75 0 
1.6.1 Probability of being caught 0.75 0 
2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material 38 38 
2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material 0.00343 0.00343 
2.1.3. Material Form  solid solid 
2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose 0.0000034 0.0000034 
2.1.5. Heat load of material 0.0058 0.0058 
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity 0 0 
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity  100000 100000 
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity 100000 100000 
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container 548 548 
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container 1.249182 1.249182 
2.2.3. Heat load of material 0.0058 0.0058 
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr  0 0 
2.2.5. Host country size 3475859 3475859 
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities 20 20 
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate 0.75 0 
3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form 6 6 
3.1.2. Number of export controlled/equipment/materials 7 7 
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement 2 2 
3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers required  20 20 
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Table 10: Continued  
Fresh Fuel Assembly 
  Uranium 
  Safeguards 
No 
Safeguards 
 
3.3.2. 
Number of skilled workers required (e.g. 
electrician) 1 1 
3.3.3. 
Number of advanced degree work (e.g. Grad 
Student Work) 1 1 
3.3.4. 
Number of Technical Experts (e.g. Adams on 
Transport) 1 1 
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force? 1 0 
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate 30 30 
3.4.3. Sensitivity of IAEA equipment 2.87 0 
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures  3 3 
3.4.5. Facility size  1000 1000 
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process 0 0 
3.4.7. Sonic load 0 0 
3.4.8. Radiation load 0.00034 0.00034 
3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted  0 0 
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions 0 0 
4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate 2.73E+04 27300 
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter  6.00E-04 0.0006 
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material  171 171 
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods? 0 0 
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram 7 7 
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose  0.000006 0.000006 
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity  0 0 
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity 0.82 0.82 
4.3.1. 
Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type 
alternatives  0.5 0.5 
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Table 11: Scenario Inputs for Spent Fuel Assembly Diversion 
 Spent Fuel Assembly 
 Uranium Thorium 
 Safeguards No Safeguards Safeguards No Safeguards 
1.1.1. 44 44 44 44 
1.1.2. 0.00396 0.00396 0.00396 0.00396 
1.1.3. 6 6 6 6 
1.1.4. solid solid solid solid 
1.1.5. 83 83 130 130 
1.1.6. SlowPlastic SlowPlastic SlowPlastic SlowPlastic 
1.1.7. 200 200 200 200 
1.1.8. 1.06 1.06 0.62 0.62 
1.2.1. 0.5 1 0.5 1 
1.2.2. 0 1 0 1 
1.2.3. monthly never monthly never 
1.2.4 240 240 240 240 
1.3.1. 0.75 0 0.75 0 
1.4.1 0 0 0 0 
1.4.2 30 30 30 30 
1.4.3 1 1 1 1 
1.4.4 1 1 1 1 
1.4.5 0 0 0 0 
1.4.6 0 0 0 0 
1.4.7 0 0 0 0 
1.5.1 0.75 0 0.75 0 
1.6.1 0.75 0 0.75 0 
2.1.1. 44 44 44 44 
2.1.2. 0.00396 0.00396 0.00396 0.00396 
2.1.3. solid solid solid solid 
2.1.4. 83 83 130 130 
2.1.5. 1.06 1.06 0.62 0.62 
2.1.6. 0 0 0 0 
2.1.7. 100000 100000 100000 100000 
2.1.8. 100000 100000 100000 100000 
2.2.1. 2617.5 2617.5 2523.5 2523.5 
2.2.2. 1.249182 1.249182 1.249182 1.249182 
2.2.3. 1.06 1.06 0.62 0.62 
2.2.4. 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 
2.2.5. 3475861 3475861 3475862 3475862 
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  Table 11: Continued   
 Uranium Thorium 
 Safeguards No Safeguards Safeguards No Safeguards 
 
 
2.2.6. 20 20 20 20 
2.2.7. 0.75 0 0.75 0 
3.1.1. 6 6 6 6 
3.1.2. 7 7 7 7 
3.1.3. 2 2 2 2 
3.3.1. 20 20 20 20 
3.3.2. 1 1 1 1 
3.3.3. 1 1 1 1 
3.3.4. 1 1 1 1 
3.4.1. 1 0 1 0 
3.4.2. 30 30 30 30 
3.4.3. 2.87 0 2.87 0 
3.4.4. 3 3 3 3 
3.4.5. 1000 1000 1000 1000 
3.4.6. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.7. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.8. 8300 8300 13000 13000 
3.4.9. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.10. 0 0 0 0 
4.1.1. 31500 31500 31500 31500 
4.1.2. 6.00E-04 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
4.1.3. 171 171 171 171 
4.1.4. 0 0 0 0 
4.1.5. 7 7 7 7 
4.2.1. 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 
4.2.2. 0 0 0 0 
4.2.3. 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
4.3.1. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
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Table 12: Scenario Inputs for FBRFC-PUREX Diversion 
 
 PUREX Theft 
 Uranium Thorium 
 Safeguards No Safeguards Safeguards No Safeguards 
1.1.1. 1809 1809 1809 1809 
1.1.2. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1.1.3. 3 3 6 6 
1.1.4. liquid liquid liquid liquid 
1.1.5. 6.00E-06 0.000006 3.20E-02 0.032 
1.1.6. SlowPlastic SlowPlastic SlowPlastic SlowPlastic 
1.1.7. 130 130 130 130 
1.1.8. 0.289090909 0.289090909 0.169090909 0.169090909 
1.2.1. 1.068 1.068 1.068 1.068 
1.2.2. 0.75 1 0.75 1 
1.2.3. monthly never monthly never 
1.2.4 300 300 300 300 
1.3.1. 0.75 0 0.75 0 
1.4.1 1 1 1 1 
1.4.2 2 2 2 2 
1.4.3 1 1 1 1 
1.4.4 0 0 0 0 
1.4.5 0 0 0 0 
1.4.6 1 1 1 1 
1.4.7 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
1.5.1 0.75 0 0.75 0 
1.6.1 0.75 0 0.75 0 
2.1.1. 1809 1809 1809 1809 
2.1.2. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
2.1.3. liquid liquid liquid liquid 
2.1.4. 0.000006 0.000006 0.032 0.032 
2.1.5. 0.289090909 0.289090909 0.169090909 0.169090909 
2.1.6. 0 0 0 0 
2.1.7. 25 25 25 25 
2.1.8. 2 2 2 2 
2.2.1. 2064 2064 2064 2064 
2.2.2. 0.624591 0.624591 1.249182 1.249182 
2.2.3. 0.289090909 0.289090909 0.169090909 0.169090909 
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  Table 12: Continued   
 Uranium Thorium 
 Safeguards No Safeguards Safeguards No Safeguards 
2.2.4. 0 0 0 0 
2.2.5. 3475863 3475863 3475864 3475864 
2.2.6. 20 20 20 20 
2.2.7. 0.75 0 0.75 0 
3.1.1. 3 3 3 3 
3.1.2. 7 7 7 7 
3.1.3. 2 2 2 2 
3.3.1. 20 20 20 20 
3.3.2. 1 1 1 1 
3.3.3. 1 1 1 1 
3.3.4. 1 1 1 1 
3.4.1. 1 0 1 0 
3.4.2. 30 30 30 30 
3.4.3. 2.87 0 2.87 0 
3.4.4. 2 2 2 2 
3.4.5. 1000 1000 1000 1000 
3.4.6. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.7. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.8. 0.0006 0.0006 3.2 3.2 
3.4.9. 0 0 0 0 
3.4.10. 0 0 0 0 
4.1.1. 31500 31500 31500 31500 
4.1.2. 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
4.1.3. 171 171 171 171 
4.1.4. 0 0 0 0 
4.1.5. 7 7 7 7 
4.2.1. 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 
4.2.2. 0 0 0 0 
4.2.3. 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
4.3.1. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
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Table 13: Scenario Inputs for LWR-PUREX Diversion 
 
  LWR Standard  
  Uranium  
  Safeguards No Safeguards  
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  1809 1809  
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  0.6 0.6  
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ 3 3  
1.1.4. Material Form  liquid liquid  
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose  6.00E-06 0.000006  
1.1.6. Chemical reactivity  SlowPlastic SlowPlastic  
1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process  130 130  
1.1.8. Heat load of material  0.29 0.29  
1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements  1.068 1.068  
1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF 0.75 1  
1.2.3. Frequency of measurement monthly never  
1.2.4 Amount of Material Available 300 300  
1.3.1. Probability of detection 0.75 0  
1.4.1 
Is there enough physical space to make 
modifications 1 1  
1.4.2 Number of People for Modifications 2 2  
1.4.3 Remote handling tools required? 1 1  
1.4.4 Specialized tools required? 0 0  
1.4.5 
Requirement for the process to be halted for 
modifications 0 0  
1.4.6 Risk of Modification (safety) 1 1  
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment 0.25 0.25  
1.5.1 Probability of being caught 0.75 0  
1.6.1 Probability of being caught 0.75 0  
2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material 1809 1809  
2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material 0.6 0.6  
2.1.3. Material Form  liquid liquid  
2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose 0.000006 0.000006  
2.1.5. Heat load of material 0.29 0.29  
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity 0 0  
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity  25 25  
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity 2 2  
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container 2109 2109  
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 Table 13: Continued    
  LWR Standard  
  Uranium  
  Safeguards No Safeguards  
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container 0.733 0.733  
2.2.3. Heat load of material 0.29 0.29  
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr  0.1016 0.1016  
2.2.5. Host country size 3475865 3475865  
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities 20 20  
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate 0.75 0  
3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form 3 3  
3.1.2. 
Number of export 
controlled/equipment/materials 7 7  
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement 2 2  
3.3.1. 
Number of unskilled workers required (e.g. 
construction) 20 20  
3.3.2. 
Number of skilled workers required (e.g. 
electrician) 1 1  
3.3.3. 
Number of advanced degree work (e.g. Grad 
Student Work) 1 1  
3.3.4. 
Number of Technical Experts (e.g. Adams on 
Transport) 1 1  
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force? 1 0  
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate 30 30  
3.4.3. Sensitivity of IAEA equipment 2.87 0  
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures  2 2  
3.4.5. Facility size  1000 1000  
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process 0 0  
3.4.7. Sonic load 0 0  
3.4.8. Radiation load 0.0006 0.0006  
3.4.9. 
Volume of non-naturally occurring gases 
emitted  0 0  
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions 0 0  
4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate 456 456  
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter  0.06724 0.06724  
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material  171 171  
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods? 0 0  
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram 7 7  
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose  0.0006724 0.0006724  
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity  0 0  
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  LWR Standard  
  Uranium  
  Safeguards No Safeguards  
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity 0.82 0.82  
4.3.1. 
Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon 
type alternatives  0.5 0.5  
 
 
Table 14: Scenario Inputs for Weapons-ready Plutonium Diversion 
 
   
Weaponized 
Metal 
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material   8 
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material   0.000404 
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ  2 
1.1.4. Material Form   solid 
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose   0.0000034 
1.1.6. Chemical reactivity   n n n n n y 
1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process   1 
1.1.8. Heat load of material   0.223 
1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements   1.5 
1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF  1 
1.2.3. Frequency of measurement  0 
1.2.4 Amount of Material Available  300 
1.3.1. Probability of detection  0 
1.4.1 Is there enough physical space to make modifications  1 
1.4.2 Number of People for Modifications  1 
1.4.3 Remote handling tools required?  0 
1.4.4 Specialized tools required?  1 
1.4.5 Requirement for the process to be halted for modifications  0 
1.4.6 Risk of Modification (safety)  0 
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment  0 
1.5.1 Probability of being caught  0 
1.6.1 Probability of being caught  0 
2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  8 
2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  0.000404 
2.1.3. Material Form   solid 
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Weaponized 
Metal 
2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose  0.0000034 
2.1.5. Heat load of material  0.223 
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity  0 
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity   0 
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity  0 
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container  8 
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container  0.000404 
2.2.3. Heat load of material  0.223 
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr   0 
2.2.5. Host country size  0 
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities  20 
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate  0 
3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form  0 
3.1.2. Number of export controlled/equipment/materials  0 
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement  1 
3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers required (e.g. construction)  0 
3.3.2. Number of skilled workers required (e.g. electrician)  0 
3.3.3. Number of advanced degree work (e.g. Grad Student Work)  0 
3.3.4. Number of Technical Experts (e.g. Adams on Transport)  0 
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force?  0 
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate  0 
3.4.3. Sensitivity of IAEA equipment  0 
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures   0 
3.4.5. Facility size   1000 
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process  0 
3.4.7. Sonic load  0 
3.4.8. Radiation load  0 
3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted   0 
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions  0 
4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate  22 
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter   0.00E+00 
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material   0 
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods?  0 
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram  7 
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose   0 
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity   0 
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Weaponized 
Metal 
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity  0.75 
4.3.1. 
Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type 
alternatives   0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Scenario Inputs for In-Reactor Diversion 
 
   In Reactor 
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material   1809 
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material   1.1.2. 
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ  6 
1.1.4. Material Form   solid 
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose   6000 
1.1.6. Chemical reactivity   FastEverything 
1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process   800 
1.1.8. Heat load of material   330 
1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements   1.5 
1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF  1 
1.2.3. Frequency of measurement  1.2.3. 
1.2.4 Amount of Material Available  300 
1.3.1. Probability of detection  0 
1.4.1 Is there enough physical space to make modifications  0 
1.4.2 Number of People for Modifications  1000 
1.4.3 Remote handling tools required?  1 
1.4.4 Specialized tools required?  1 
1.4.5 Requirement for the process to be halted for modifications  1 
1.4.6 Risk of Modification (safety)  10 
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment  75 
1.5.1 Probability of being caught  0 
1.6.1 Probability of being caught  0 
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  In Reactor 
2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  1809 
2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  1.1.2. 
2.1.3. Material Form   solid 
2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose  6000 
2.1.5. Heat load of material  300 
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity  1 
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity   25 
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity  2 
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container  20000 
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container  3 
2.2.3. Heat load of material  50 
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr   0.3 
2.2.5. Host country size  3475865 
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities  20 
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate  0 
3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form  7 
3.1.2. Number of export controlled/equipment/materials  120 
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement  1 
3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers required (e.g. construction)  10000 
3.3.2. Number of skilled workers required (e.g. electrician)  1000 
3.3.3. Number of advanced degree work (e.g. Grad Student Work)  1000 
3.3.4. Number of Technical Experts (e.g. Adams on Transport)  20 
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force?  0 
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate  0 
3.4.3. Sensitivity of IAEA equipment  3.4.3. 
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures   4 
3.4.5. Facility size   1000 
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process  50 
3.4.7. Sonic load  0 
3.4.8. Radiation load  6000 
3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted   0 
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions  0 
4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate  4.1.1. 
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter   4.1.2. 
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material   4.1.3. 
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods?  0 
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  In Reactor 
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram  7 
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose   4.2.1. 
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity   4.2.2. 
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity  4.2.3. 
4.3.1. 
Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type 
alternatives   4.3.1. 
 
 
 
Table 16: Scenario Inputs for Natural Uranium Diversion 
  Natural Uranium 
1.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material  10714 
1.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material  400000 
1.1.3. Number of items/SQ 1000 
1.1.4. Material Form  solid 
1.1.5. Radiation level in terms of dose  1.1.5. 
1.1.6. Chemical reactivity  SlowPlastic 
1.1.7. Temperature of Source Process  1 
1.1.8. Heat load of material  1.1.8. 
1.2.1. Uncertainty in accountancy measurements  1.5 
1.2.2. Expected vs. Actual MUF 1 
1.2.3. Frequency of measurement never 
1.2.4 Amount of Material Available 300 
1.3.1. Probability of detection 0 
1.4.1 Is there enough physical space to make modifications 1 
1.4.2 Number of People for Modifications 1000 
1.4.3 Remote handling tools required? 0 
1.4.4 Specialized tools required? 1 
1.4.5 Requirement for the process to be halted for modifications 0 
1.4.6 Risk of Modification (safety) 0 
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment 0 
1.5.1 Probability of being caught 0 
1.6.1 Probability of being caught 0 
2.1.1. Mass/SQ of nuclear material 10714 
2.1.2. Volume/SQ of nuclear material 400000 
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Natural Uranium 
2.1.3. Material Form  solid 
2.1.4. Radiation level in terms of dose 1.1.5. 
2.1.5. Heat load of material 2.1.5. 
2.1.6. Chemical reactivity 0.9 
2.1.7. Immediate Chemical toxicity  2 
2.1.8. Time Average Chemical toxicity 0.2 
2.2.1. Mass of material and transportation container 10714 
2.2.2. Volume of material and transportation container 400000 
2.2.3. Heat load of material 2.2.3. 
2.2.4. Shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10 mR/hr  2.2.4. 
2.2.5. Host country size 3475865 
2.2.6. Number of declared nuclear facilities 20 
2.2.7. IAEA imagery analysis rate 0 
3.1.1. Number of process steps to metallic form 4 
3.1.2. Number of export controlled/equipment/materials 120 
3.1.3. Minimum electrical requirement 1000 
3.3.1. Number of unskilled workers required (e.g. construction) 10000 
3.3.2. Number of skilled workers required (e.g. electrician) 1000 
3.3.3. Number of advanced degree work (e.g. Grad Student Work) 500 
3.3.4. Number of Technical Experts (e.g. Adams on Transport) 20 
3.4.1. Additional Protocol in force? 0 
3.4.2. Environmental sampling rate 0 
3.4.3. Sensitivity of IAEA equipment 0 
3.4.4. Isotopic signatures  4 
3.4.5. Facility size  60000 
3.4.6. Heat load of transformation process 700 
3.4.7. Sonic load 140 
3.4.8. Radiation load 3.4.8. 
3.4.9. Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted  0 
3.4.10. Undiluted volume liquid emissions 0 
4.1.1. Spont. fission n prod. Rate 0 
4.1.2. Radiation exposure at one meter  0.000042 
4.1.3. Heating rate of weapons material  0.00032 
4.1.4. Can use ballistic assembly methods? 1 
4.1.5. Number of phases in the phase diagram 4 
4.2.1. Radiation level in terms of dose  0.00023 
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Natural Uranium 
4.2.2. Chemical reactivity  0 
4.2.3. Radiotoxicity 0.24 
4.3.1. 
Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type 
alternatives  0 
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APPENDIX F 
PRAETOR PROGRAM TEXT 
PRAETOR consists of four base files and an input file. The first file: 
PRAETOR_v1.6.f90, is the main program file. PRAETOR_Funcs.f90 is the function 
file. Multiple weights can be added easily by new weight files. One example weight files 
are given below: Survey.i. Uniform weights can be created from Survey.i by replacing 
all values in Survey.i with unity. Finally, an input file is needed. The example input file, 
Minput.i, is the uranium-plutonium fast reactor irradiated blanket with no safeguards in 
place. 
PRAETOR_v1.6.f90 
PROGRAM PRAETOR 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    INTEGER                     ::  argc 
    CHARACTER(len=8)            ::  infile 
    CHARACTER(len=8)            ::  outfile 
    INTEGER                     ::  i,j, choice,choice2 
    REAL,DIMENSION(4)           :: K_stage, K_weight 
    REAL,DIMENSION(14)          :: K_second ! second tier weight 
    REAL,DIMENSION(14)          :: K_second_vals, U_second! second tier 
calculated K's 
    REAL,DIMENSION(4)           :: U_stage 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)           ::  us=0.0 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)          ::  ks 
    REAL                        :: tmp 
    REAL                        :: K,U 
    REAL    :: fsolve,fusolve 
    REAL                :: norm_to 
    INTEGER         :: s,e 
     
    !argc = IARGC() 
    !IF(argc .NE. 2) THEN 
    !    WRITE(*,*) '======== Usage: maua infile outfile =========' 
    !ENDIF 
     
!    CALL GETARG(1, infile) 
!    CALL GETARG(2, outfile) 
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    WRITE(*,*) 'Shall I use the Normalized Weights or Survey Weights?' 
    WRITE(*,*) '1) Normalized Weights' 
    WRITE(*,*) '2) Survey Weights' 
    READ(*,*) choice 
    !    choice=1 
 
    IF(choice==1) THEN 
     infile = 'normal.i' 
    ELSEIF(Choice==2) THEN 
        WRITE(*,*) 'What survey?' 
        WRITE(*,*) '1) Mixed group' 
        WRITE(*,*) '2) Expert group' 
        WRITE(*,*) '3) Non-expert group' 
        READ(*,*) choice2 
        !    choice2 = 1 
        if(choice2==1) infile = 'mixsur.i' 
        if(choice2==2) infile = 'expsur.i' 
        if(choice2==3) infile = 'nonsur.i' 
    ELSE 
        STOP 'Invalid weight selection. Halting.' 
    ENDIF 
 
    WRITE(*,*) 'Is the Aversary risk-seeking or risk-averse?' 
    WRITE(*,*) '1) Risk-seeking' 
    WRITE(*,*) '2) Risk-averse' 
    READ(*,*) choice 
    !    choice=2 
 
    IF(choice==1) THEN 
     norm_to = 0.5 
    ELSEIF(Choice==2) THEN 
        norm_to = 2.0 
    ELSE 
        STOP 'Invalid selection. Halting.' 
    ENDIF 
 
    outfile = 'output.o' 
 
    OPEN(UNIT=11, FILE=outfile, STATUS='REPLACE')   ! output 
   
    OPEN(UNIT=9, FILE='Minput.i', STATUS='old')     ! u_i values 
 
    OPEN(UNIT=10, FILE=infile, STATUS='OLD')        ! k values 
    !OPEN(UNIT=39, FILE=Weightfile, STATUS='OLD') 
     
    !WRITE(*,*) 'Input file=',infile 
    !WRITE(*,*) 'Output file=',outfile 
     
    !WRITE(*,*) ' ' 
     
    ! get K_i weights for the 4 stages: Diversion, Transportation ... 
    DO i=1,4 
        READ(10,*) K_weight(i) 
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        ! read the tier two weights 
        IF(i==1) THEN 
            DO j=1,6 
                READ(10,*) K_second(j) 
            ENDDO 
        ELSEIF(i==2) THEN 
            DO j=7,8 
                READ(10,*) K_second(j) 
            ENDDO 
        ELSEIF(i==3) THEN 
            DO j=9,11 
                READ(10,*) K_second(j) 
            ENDDO 
        ELSEIF(i==4) THEN 
            DO j=12,14 
                READ(10,*) K_second(j) 
            ENDDO 
        ENDIF 
    ENDDO 
     
    ! read k_i weights for all utility functions 
    DO i=1,63 
        READ(10,*) ks(i) 
    ENDDO 
     
    CALL build_u(us, ks) 
     
    ! START: Diversion     
    ! Material handling difficulty during diversion 
    s=1 
    e=8     
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(1) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(1) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(1),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system 
    s=9 
    e=12 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(2) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(2) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(2),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Difficulty of evading detection by the material control system  
    !s=13 
    !e=13 
    !CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    !K_second_vals(3) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    !U_second(3) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(3),us,s,e,ks) 
    K_second_vals(3) = ks(13) 
    U_second(3) = us(13) 
     
    ! Difficulty of covertly making facility modifications 
    s=14 
    e=20 
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    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(4) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(4) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(4),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Difficulty of evading IAEA with covert facility modifications 
    !s=21 
    !e=21 
    !CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    !K_second_vals(5) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    !U_second(5) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(5),us,s,e,ks) 
    K_second_vals(5) = ks(21) 
    U_second(5) = us(21) 
     
    ! Off Normal Detection System 
    !s=22 
    !e=22 
    !CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    !K_second_vals(6) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    !U_second(6) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(6),us,s,e,ks) 
    K_second_vals(6) = ks(22) 
    U_second(6) = us(22) 
     
    WRITE(11,*) ' --- DIVERSION STAGE --- ' 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Material handling difficulty during diversion                  
K,U=',K_second_vals(1),U_second(1) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting 
system       K,U=',K_second_vals(2),U_second(2) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of evading detection by the material 
control system K,U=',K_second_vals(3),U_second(3) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of covertly making facility modifications           
K,U=',K_second_vals(4),U_second(4) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of evading IAEA with covert facility 
modifications  K,U=',K_second_vals(5),U_second(5) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Off Normal Detection System                                    
K,U=',K_second_vals(6),U_second(6) 
    ! END: Diversion 
     
    ! START: Transportation 
    ! Material handling difficulty during transportation 
    s=23 
    e=30 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(7) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(7) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(7),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Difficulty of evading detection during transport 
    s=31 
    e=37 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(8) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(8) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(8),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    WRITE(11,*) ' --- TRANSPORTATION STAGE --- ' 
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    WRITE(11,*) 'Material handling difficulty during transportation             
K,U=',K_second_vals(7),U_second(7) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of evading detection during transport               
K,U=',K_second_vals(8),U_second(8) 
    ! END: Transportation 
     
    ! START: Transformation 
    ! Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials 
    s=38 
    e=40 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(9) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(9) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(9),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Workforce required for transformation 
    s=41 
    e=44 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(10) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(10) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(10),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities 
    s=45 
    e=54 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(11) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(11) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(11),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    WRITE(11,*) ' --- TRANSFORMATION STAGE --- ' 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted 
materials  K,U=',K_second_vals(9),U_second(9) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Workforce required for transformation                          
K,U=',K_second_vals(10),U_second(10) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty of evading detection of transformation 
activities   K,U=',K_second_vals(11),U_second(11) 
    ! END: Transportation 
     
    ! START: Wep Fab 
    ! Difficulty associated with design 
    s=55 
    e=59 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(12) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(12) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(12),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Handling difficulties 
    s=60 
    e=62 
    CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    K_second_vals(13) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    U_second(13) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(13),us,s,e,ks) 
     
    ! Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate 
    !s=63 
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    !e=63 
    !CALL normalize(ks,63, s, e, norm_to)  
    !K_second_vals(14) = fsolve(norm_to, ks, s, e) 
    !U_second(14) = fusolve(0,K_second_vals(14),us,s,e,ks) 
    K_second(14) = ks(63) 
    U_second(14) = us(63) 
     
    WRITE(11,*) ' --- WEAPON FABRICATION STAGE --- ' 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Difficulty associated with design                              
K,U=',K_second_vals(12),U_second(12) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Handling difficulties                                          
K,U=',K_second_vals(13),U_second(13) 
    WRITE(11,*) 'Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate            
K,U=',K_second_vals(14),U_second(14) 
    ! END: Wep Fab 
     
    ! now we do the second tier... 
    ! diversion 
    s=1 
    e=6 
    CALL normalize(K_second,14, s, e, norm_to) 
    K_stage(1) = fsolve(norm_to, K_second, s,e) 
    U_stage(1) = fusolve(0,K_stage(1),U_second,s,e,K_second) 
     
    ! transportation 
    s=7 
    e=8 
    !DO i=s,e 
    !    write(*,*) 'i,K_second(i),U_second(i)=', i, K_second(i), 
U_second(i) 
    !ENDDO 
    CALL normalize(K_second,14, s, e, norm_to) 
    K_stage(2) = fsolve(norm_to, K_second, s,e) 
    U_stage(2) = fusolve(0,K_stage(2),U_second,s,e,K_second) 
    !WRITE(*,*) '  Diversion             K,U=',K_stage(1),U_stage(1) 
     
    ! transformation 
    s=9 
    e=11 
    CALL normalize(K_second,14, s, e, norm_to) 
    K_stage(3) = fsolve(norm_to, K_second, s,e) 
    U_stage(3) = fusolve(0,K_stage(3),U_second,s,e,K_second) 
     
    ! wep fab 
    s=12 
    e=14 
    CALL normalize(K_second,14, s, e, norm_to) 
    K_stage(4) = fsolve(norm_to, K_second, s,e) 
    U_stage(4) = fusolve(0,K_stage(4),U_second,s,e,K_second) 
     
    WRITE(11,*) ' ' 
    WRITE(11,*) '  --- Second Tier --------------------------------- ' 
    WRITE(11,*) '  Diversion             K,U=',K_stage(1),U_stage(1) 
    WRITE(11,*) '  Transportation        K,U=',K_stage(2),U_stage(2) 
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    WRITE(11,*) '  Transformation        K,U=',K_stage(3),U_stage(3) 
    WRITE(11,*) '  Weapon Fabrication    K,U=',K_stage(4),U_stage(4) 
     
    !WRITE(*,*) ' ' 
     
    !DO i=1,4 
    !    write(*,*) 'i,K_weight(i),U_stage(i)=', i, K_weight(i), 
U_stage(i) 
    !ENDDO 
    CALL normalize(K_weight,4,1,4,norm_to) 
    K = fsolve(norm_to, K_weight,1,4) 
    U = fusolve(0,K,U_stage,1,4,K_weight) 
    WRITE(11,*) '     --- Third Tier --------------------------------- 
' 
    WRITE(11,*) '     Final     K,U=',K,U 
 
    WRITE(11,*) '            Overall U=',U 
 
     
    CLOSE(9) 
    CLOSE(10) 
     
 
 CLOSE(11) 
 
END PROGRAM PRAETOR 
 
SUBROUTINE build_u(us, z, x) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)          ::  us 
    REAL                        :: h,m_tot 
    CHARACTER(len=12)            :: str 
    INTEGER                     :: i, z, x 
     
    DO i=1,63 
 
        IF(i==4 .OR. i==6 .OR. i==11 .OR. i==25) THEN 
            ! string input 
            READ(9,*) str 
            CALL u_str(i,str,us(i)) 
        ELSE   
            ! real input 
            READ(9,*) h 
            CALL u(i,h,us(i)) 
        ENDIF 
         
        !WRITE(*,*) i,'x=',h,'u(i)=',us(i) 
    ENDDO 
     
END SUBROUTINE 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
! Newton's method to find U for: 
! 1+K*U=sum(1+K*u_i*k_i) 
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REAL FUNCTION fusolve(x,K,us,starti,endi,ks) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL                ::  x 
    REAL                ::  K 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  us 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  ks 
    INTEGER             ::  starti, endi 
     
    INTEGER             :: KMAX=20 
    REAL                :: EPS=1e-5 
    REAL                :: fx,fpx   
    REAL                :: xc 
    INTEGER             :: q 
    REAL    :: fu,dfu 
 
    xc = x 
     
    fx = 1.0 
     
    DO q=starti,endi 
        fx = fx * (1 + us(q) * ks(q) * K) 
    ENDDO 
     
    fx = fx - 1.0 
    fx = fx / K 
     
    fusolve = fx 
     
    RETURN 
 
     
END FUNCTION fusolve 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
! f(K,k_1,k_2,k_3 ...)=SUM[ 1 + K * k_i ] - ( 1 + K ) 
REAL FUNCTION f(x,ks,starti,endi) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL                ::  x 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  ks 
    INTEGER             ::  starti, endi 
    INTEGER             ::  i 
     
    f = 1.0 
     
    DO i=starti,endi 
        f = f * (1 + x * ks(i)) 
    ENDDO 
     
    f = f - (1 + x) 
    RETURN 
     
END FUNCTION f 
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! df(K,k_1,k_2,k_3 ...)=slope of f(...) 
REAL FUNCTION df(x,ks,starti,endi) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL                ::  x 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  ks 
    INTEGER             ::  starti, endi 
    REAL                ::  EPS=1e-5 
    REAL    :: f 
     
    df = ( f(x,ks,starti,endi)-f(x+EPS,ks,starti,endi) ) / EPS 
     
    RETURN 
     
END FUNCTION df 
 
! changed to bisection method for bounding purposes... 
REAL FUNCTION fsolve(norm_to,ks,starti,endi) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL                ::  norm_to 
    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  ks 
    INTEGER             ::  starti, endi 
     
    INTEGER             :: KMAX=400 
    REAL                :: EPS=1e-5 
    REAL                :: fx,fpx   
    REAL                :: xc 
    INTEGER             :: k 
    REAL    :: f,df 
    real    :: left,right 
     
    if(norm_to==0.5) then 
        ! for sum(k)=0.5 
        left = 1e-5 
        right = 100.0 
    elseif(norm_to==2.0) then 
        ! for sum(k)=2.0 
        left = -1.0 
        right = -1e-5 
    endif 
     
    DO k=1,KMAX 
        xc = (right+left)/2.0; 
         
        !WRITE(*,*)'left,right = ',left,right 
         
        IF( f(xc,ks,starti,endi) * f(right,ks,starti,endi) < 0 ) THEN 
            left = xc 
        ELSE 
            right = xc 
        ENDIF 
     
        IF( ABS(left-right) < EPS ) THEN 
            fsolve = xc 
            RETURN 
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            EXIT 
        ENDIF 
    ENDDO 
     
    IF( k >= KMAX ) THEN 
        WRITE(*,*) "Iterated more than KMAX..." 
        fsolve = (right+left)/2.0; 
        RETURN 
    ENDIF 
 
END FUNCTION fsolve 
 
! Newton's method on f(...) 
!REAL FUNCTION fsolve(x,ks,starti,endi) 
!  IMPLICIT NONE 
!    REAL                ::  x 
!    REAL,DIMENSION(63)  ::  ks 
!    INTEGER             ::  starti, endi 
!     
!    INTEGER             :: KMAX=100 
!    REAL                :: EPS=1e-5 
!    REAL                :: fx,fpx   
!    REAL                :: xc 
!    INTEGER             :: k 
!    REAL    :: f,df 
! 
!    xc = x 
!    DO k=1,KMAX 
!        fx = f(xc,ks,starti,endi) 
!        fpx = df(xc,ks,starti,endi) 
!         
!        !WRITE(*,'(1X,3(A,F10.5))') 'fx=', fx, ' fpx=', fpx, ' xc=', 
xc 
!         
!        IF( ABS(fx) < EPS ) THEN 
!            fsolve = xc 
!            RETURN 
!            EXIT 
!        ENDIF 
!         
!        xc = xc + fx / fpx 
!    ENDDO 
! 
!    IF( k >= KMAX ) THEN 
!        WRITE(*,*) "Iterated more than KMAX..." 
!    ENDIF 
!END FUNCTION fsolve 
 
REAL function Risk(input) 
 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL                ::  input, a, b 
 
 a=100.0 
149 
 
 
 
 b=0.1 
 risk=((1+a)*(1/(1+a*EXP(-input*b)))-1)/a 
      Return 
 
END function Risk 
 
! normalizes 'vector' of size 'n' to 'normalize_to', starting at index 
'start_ndx' ending at 'end_ndx' elements 
SUBROUTINE normalize(vector,n, start_ndx, end_ndx, normalize_to) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    INTEGER             :: n 
    REAL,DIMENSION(n)   :: vector 
    INTEGER             :: start_ndx, end_ndx 
    REAL                :: normalize_to 
    REAL                :: sum 
    INTEGER             :: i 
     
    sum = 0.0 
     
    DO i=start_ndx,end_ndx 
        sum = sum + vector(i) 
    ENDDO 
     
    DO i=start_ndx,end_ndx 
        vector(i) = vector(i)/sum*normalize_to 
    ENDDO 
     
END SUBROUTINE 
 
PRAETOR_Funcs.f90 
SUBROUTINE u(n,h,o) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL :: h,o 
    INTEGER :: n 
     
    CALL u_full(n,h,o,'',0.0) 
END SUBROUTINE 
 
SUBROUTINE u_str(n,str,o) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL :: o 
    CHARACTER(len=12) :: str 
    INTEGER :: n 
     
    CALL u_full(n,0.0,o,str,0.0) 
END SUBROUTINE 
     
SUBROUTINE u_full(n,h,o,str,m_tot) 
  IMPLICIT NONE 
    REAL :: h,o,m_tot, risk 
    CHARACTER(len=12) :: str 
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    INTEGER :: n 
     
    ! mass/SQ of nuclear material 
    IF(n==1) THEN 
         
        o = EXP(-25*8/h) 
     
    ! volume/SQ of nuclear material 
    ELSEIF(n==2) THEN 
         
        o = EXP(-2000*0.000404/(h**(0.33))) 
     
    !number of items/SQ 
    ELSEIF(n==3) THEN 
         
        o = 1.0 - EXP(-0.1*(h**0.44)) 
     
    !material form 
    ! type(str)=string: "solid" | "powder" | "liquid" | "gas" 
    ELSEIF(n==4) THEN 
         
        IF(str == "solid") THEN 
            o = 0.1 
        ELSEIF(str == "powder") THEN 
            o = 0.5 
        ELSEIF(str == "liquid") THEN 
            o = 0.7 
        ELSEIF(str == "gas") THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid input detected for u4 or u24' 
        ENDIF 
         
        !WRITE(*,*) 'o=',o 
     
    !radiation level in terms of dose 
    ELSEIF(n==5) THEN 
             
        IF(h <= .002) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h <= .05) THEN 
            o = 1.30208*h - 0.010416 
        ELSEIF(h <= 0.75) THEN 
            o = 0.089285*h + 0.232142 
        ELSEIF(h <= 6) THEN 
            o = 0.0238095*h + 0.4285714 
        ELSEIF(h > 6) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !chemical reactivity 
    !answer is 'y' or 'n' for the following 
    !   Reacts   Reaction 
    !   with     Rate 
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    !1. Air      Fast 
    !2. Water    Fast 
    !3. Steel    Fast 
    !4. Plastic  Fast 
    !5. Steel    Slow 
    !6. Plastic  Slow 
    !FOR EXAMPLE: input='y y y y n n' means that it reacts with  
    !  air,water,steel(fast),plastic(fast) but NOT 
steel(slow),plastic(slow) 
    !input must always be an 11 character string with only 'y' or 'n' 
in every other position 
    ELSEIF(n==6) THEN 
         
        o=0. 
         
        IF( str(1:1) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .3 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(3:3) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .3 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(5:5) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .2 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(7:7) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .2 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(9:9) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .1 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(11:11) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o + .1 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(5:5) == 'y' .AND. str(9:9) == 'y' ) THEN    
!corrections 
            o = o - .1 
        ENDIF 
        IF( str(7:7) == 'y' .AND. str(11:11) == 'y' ) THEN 
            o = o - .1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !temp and source process 
    ELSEIF(n==7) THEN 
         
        IF(h < 20) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h <= 1600) THEN 
            o = .2282*LOG(h)-.6836 
        ELSEIF(h>1600) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !heat load of mat 
    ELSEIF(n==8) THEN 
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        IF(h<.33) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h<=33) THEN 
            o = .2172*LOG(h)+.2407 
        ELSEIF(h>33) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !uncertainty in accountancy measurements 
    ELSEIF(n==9) THEN 
         
        IF(h>1) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h<=1) THEN 
            o = 1-h 
        ENDIF 
     
    !expected vs actual MUF 
    ELSEIF(n==10) THEN 
        o=0 
        RETURN 
        ! @todo - this is wrong, hack for richard 
         
        IF(h<=3) THEN 
            o = -.0333*h+1 
        ELSEIF(h<=9) THEN 
            o = -.1*h+1.2 
        ELSEIF(h<=20) THEN 
            o = -.01818*h+.04636 
        ELSEIF(h>20) THEN 
            o = .1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !freq of measurement 
    !string: continuous | hourly | daily | weekly | monthly | quarterly 
| annually | never 
    ELSEIF(n==11) THEN 
         
        IF(str == 'continuous') THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSEIF(str=='hourly') THEN 
            o=.95 
        ELSEIF(str=='daily') THEN 
            o=.85 
        ELSEIF(str=='weekly') THEN 
            o=.75 
        ELSEIF(str=='monthly') THEN 
            o=0.5 
        ELSEIF(str=='quarterly') THEN 
            o=.25 
        ELSEIF(str=='annually') THEN 
            o=.1 
        ELSEIF(str=='never') THEN 
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            o=0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid input detected for u11' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !!! 12-21 ignored for now... 
    !amount of mat avail 
    ELSEIF(n==12) THEN 
     IF (h < 20) THEN 
  o = 1 - (h/50) 
 ELSEIF (h < 200) THEN 
  o = .6-.6*(h-20)/180     
     ELSEIF (h>200) THEN 
  o = 0 
 ENDIF 
 
    !prob of detection 
    ELSEIF(n==13) THEN 
        o = risk(h) 
     
    !is there enough space to modify? 
    !input = { 0 | 1 } 
    ELSEIF(n==14) THEN 
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u14' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = 1-h 
     
    !number of ppl for modifications 
    ELSEIF(n==15) THEN 
         
        o=risk(h) 
          
    !remote handling tools req? 
    !input = { 0 | 1 } 
    ELSEIF(n==16) THEN 
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u16' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = h 
     
    !specialized tools req 
    !input = { 0 | 1 } 
    ELSEIF(n==17) THEN 
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u17' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = h 
     
    !req for the process to be halted for modifications 
    !input = { 0 | 1 } 
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    ELSEIF(n==18) THEN 
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u18' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = h 
     
    !risk of modification 
    !input = integer 
    ELSEIF(n==19) THEN 
        o = 0.229921*LOG(h+1)+0.3 
         
    !risk of penetrating containment 
    ELSEIF(n==20) THEN 
  
! call risk(h) 
 o = risk(h) 
     
    !probability of getting caught by accounting 
    ELSEIF(n==21) THEN 
!      call risk(h) 
 o = risk(h) 
 
    !probability of getting caught by process monitoring 
    ELSEIF(n==22) THEN 
!      call risk(h) 
 o = risk(h) 
     
    !mass/SQ of mat 
    ! @see u1 
    ELSEIF(n==23) THEN 
         
        CALL u(1,h,o) 
     
    !volume/SQ of mat 
    ! @see u2 
    ELSEIF(n==24) THEN 
         
        CALL u(2,h,o) 
     
    !material form 
    ! @see u4 
    ELSEIF(n==25) THEN 
         
        CALL u_str(4,str,o) 
     
    !radiation level in terms of dose 
    ! @see u5 
    ELSEIF(n==26) THEN 
         
        CALL u(5,h,o) 
     
    !heat load 
    ! @see u8 
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    ELSEIF(n==27) THEN 
         
        CALL u(8,h,o) 
     
    !chemical reactivity 
    ! @see u6 
    ELSEIF(n==28) THEN 
         
        CALL u(6,h,o) 
     
    !immediate chemical toxicity 
    ELSEIF(n==29) THEN 
         
        IF(h>10000) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h<1) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = -.1086*LOG(h)+1 
        ENDIF 
     
    !time average chemical toxicity 
    ELSEIF(n==30) THEN 
         
        IF(h>1000) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h<.001) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = -.0724*LOG(h)+.5 
        ENDIF 
     
    !mass of mat and transportation container 
    ELSEIF(n==31) THEN 
         
        IF(h<100) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h>90000) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = .147*LOG(h)-.677 
        ENDIF 
     
    !vol of mat and transportation container 
    ELSEIF(n==32) THEN 
         
        IF(h<1) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h>700) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = .1526*LOG(h) 
        ENDIF 
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    !heat load of mat 
    ! @see u8 
    ELSEIF(n==33) THEN 
         
        CALL u(8,h,o) 
     
    !shield thickness to reduce radiation to 10mR/Hr 
    ELSEIF(n==34) THEN 
         
        IF(h>=2) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = 0.5*h 
        ENDIF 
     
    !host country size 
    ELSEIF(n==35) THEN 
         
        IF(h>17000000) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h<2500) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSE 
            o = -.1133*LOG(h)+1.8862 
        ENDIF 
     
    !number of declared nuclear facilities 
    ELSEIF(n==36) THEN 
         
        IF(h>100) THEN 
            o = 0 
        ELSEIF(h>=1 .AND. h<=100) THEN 
            o = -.01*h+1.01 
        ELSE 
            WRITE(*,*) 'Host country cannot be considered as it has no 
facilities, see u35' 
            STOP 
        ENDIF 
     
    !IAEA imagery analysis rate 
    ELSEIF(n==37) THEN 
         
        o=h 
   
    !number of process steps to metallic form 
    ELSEIF(n==38) THEN 
         
        IF( h > 11 .OR. h < 0 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u37' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = h/11. 
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    !number of export controlled/equipment/materials 
    ELSEIF(n==39) THEN 
         
        IF(h>178) THEN 
            o = 1. 
        ELSEIF(h>=0 .AND. h<=178) THEN 
            o = .0056*h 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u38()' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !minimum electrical requirement 
    ELSEIF(n==40) THEN 
        ! note: was changed to have a min value of 1 
        ! as ln() returns a negative number for < 1 
        IF(h>3360) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSEIF(h<=3360 .AND. h>=1) THEN 
            o=.1219*LOG(h) 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u39()' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !number of unskilled workers req 
    ELSEIF(n==41) THEN 
         
     
   IF(h>100000) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h<=100000 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
            o = ((100.0)*(1/(1+100.0*EXP(-h*0.001)))-1)/100.0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u42' 
        ENDIF 
 
    !number of skilled workers req 
    ELSEIF(n==42) THEN 
        
        IF(h>28000) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h<=28000 .AND. h>=1) THEN 
            o=.0977*LOG(h) 
        ELSEIF(h<1 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
            ! @todo - this is not confirmed! 
            o=0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u41()' 
        ENDIF  
 
   IF(h>28000) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h<=28000 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
            o = ((100.0)*(1/(1+100.0*EXP(-h*0.00357)))-1)/100.0 
        ELSE 
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            STOP 'Invalid range, see u42' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !number of advanced degree work 
    ELSEIF(n==43) THEN 
         
   IF(h>1000) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h<=1000 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
            o = ((100.0)*(1/(1+100.0*EXP(-h*0.1)))-1)/100.0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u42' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !number of technical experts 
    ELSEIF(n==44) THEN 
         
   IF(h>100) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h<=100 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
            o = ((500.0)*(1/(1+500.0*EXP(-h*0.3)))-1)/500.0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u42' 
        ENDIF 
  
     
    !additional protocol in force 
    ! input: { 1 | 0 } 
    ELSEIF(n==45) THEN 
         
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u44' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = h 
     
    !environmental sampling rate 
    ELSEIF(n==46) THEN 
         
        IF(h>100) THEN 
            o=1 
        ELSEIF(h>=0 .AND. h<=100) THEN 
            o=.01*h 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u45()' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !sensitivity of IAEA equipment 
    ELSEIF(n==47) THEN 
        o = EXP(-h/10) 
         
     
    !isotopic signatures 
    ELSEIF(n==48) THEN 
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        o = h*.2 
     
    !facility size 
    ELSEIF(n==49) THEN 
         
        IF(h>60000) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<100) THEN 
            o=0 
        ELSEIF(h>=100 .AND. h<=60000) THEN 
            o=.1563*LOG(h)-.7199 
        ENDIF 
     
    !heat load of transformation process 
    ELSEIF(n==50) THEN 
         
        IF(h>2500) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<.0001) THEN 
            o=0 
        ELSEIF(h>=.0001 .AND. h<=2500) THEN 
            o=.1563*LOG(h)-.7199 
        ENDIF 
     
    !sonic load 
    ELSEIF(n==51) THEN 
         
        IF(h>140) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h>=0 .AND. h<=140) THEN 
            o=.0071*h 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u50' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !radiation load 
    ELSEIF(n==52) THEN 
         
        IF(h>1000) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<.01) THEN 
            o=0 
        ELSEIF(h>=.01 .AND. h<=1000) THEN 
            o=.08686*LOG(h)+.4 
        ENDIF 
     
    !volume of non-naturally occuring gasses emitted 
    ELSEIF(n==53) THEN 
         
        IF(h>8e6) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<1e-6) THEN 
            o=0 
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        ELSEIF(h>=1e-6 .AND. h<=8e6) THEN 
            o=.0337*LOG(h)+.465 
        ENDIF 
     
    !undiluted volume liquid emissions 
    ELSEIF(n==54) THEN 
         
        IF(h>3.65e5) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<1e-6) THEN 
            o=0 
        ELSEIF(h>=1e-6 .AND. h<=3.65e5) THEN 
            o=.0376*LOG(h)+.5189 
        ENDIF 
     
    !spontaneous fission production rate 
    ELSEIF(n==55) THEN 
         
        o = 1. - EXP(-3.5*(h/2700)**1.8) 
     
    !radiation exposure at 1m 
    ELSEIF(n==56) THEN 
         
        IF(h>1000) THEN 
            o=1. 
        ELSEIF(h<.01) THEN 
            o=0 
        ELSEIF(h>=.01 .AND. h<=1000) THEN 
            o=.08686*LOG(h)+.4 
        ENDIF 
     
    !heating rate of weapons material 
    ELSEIF(n==57) THEN 
         
        o = 1. - EXP(-3*(h/171)**0.8) 
     
    !can use ballistic assembly methods? 
    ! input: {1 | 0} 
    ELSEIF(n==58) THEN 
         
        IF( ABS(h-1)>1e-5 .AND. ABS(h)>1e-5 ) THEN 
            STOP 'Invalid range for u57' 
        ENDIF 
         
        o = 1-h 
         
    !number of phases in phase diagram 
    ELSEIF(n==59) THEN 
         
        IF(h>7) THEN 
            o = 1 
        ELSEIF(h<=7 .AND. h>=1) THEN 
            o=.1667*h-.1667 
        ELSEIF(h<1 .AND. h>=0) THEN 
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            ! @todo - this is not confirmed 
            o = 0 
        ELSE 
            STOP 'Invalid range, see u58' 
        ENDIF 
     
    !radiation level in terms of dose 
    ! @see u5 
    ELSEIF(n==60) THEN 
         
        CALL u(5,h,o) 
     
    !chemical reactivity 
    ! @see u6 
    ELSEIF(n==61) THEN 
         
        CALL u(6,h,o) 
     
    !radiotoxicity 
    !input: h=x, o=output variable, m_tot=atomic mass total 
    !     x=SUM[ m_i * w_i ] 
    ! m_tot=SUM[ m_i ] 
    ELSEIF(n==62) THEN 
        ! @todo - fix this 
        !o = h/m_tot 
        o = h 
     
    !knowledge + skill level for material/weapon type alternatives 
    ELSEIF(n==63) THEN 
        o = h 
    ENDIF 
     
END SUBROUTINE 
 
Survey.i 
Survey.i presents the weights in steps. The third tier weight for diversion is given 
first, followed by all second tier weights in the diversion category. Then the 
transportation stage weight is given, followed by all second tier weights in 
transportation, et cetera. Finally, the weights of the individual utility functions are given 
as a single string.  
0.333 
0.175 
0.173 
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0.198 
0.157 
0.173 
0.128 
 
0.186 
0.510 
0.490 
 
0.277 
0.338 
0.357 
0.301 
 
0.223 
0.353 
0.272 
0.393 
 
0.177937158 
0.169740437 
0.161543716 
0.080430328 
0.18613388 
0.075990437 
0.088627049 
0.059596995 
0.28125 
0.28125 
0.203125 
0.234375 
1 
0.17251462 
0.17251462 
0.125730994 
0.125730994 
0.134502924 
0.125730994 
0.143274854 
1 
1 
0.19057377 
0.182377049 
0.124180328 
0.206967213 
0.094467213 
0.053483607 
0.069877049 
0.07807377 
0.188679245 
0.150943396 
0.103773585 
0.103773585 
0.160377358 
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0.150943396 
0.141509434 
0.34045584 
0.377492877 
0.282051282 
0.125349487 
0.27306617 
0.307548928 
0.294035415 
0.144016227 
0.118661258 
0.15551048 
0.149763354 
0.135902637 
0.061528059 
0.055780933 
0.050033807 
0.067275186 
0.061528059 
0.196804796 
0.159342675 
0.13682103 
0.199111415 
0.307920084 
0.337104377 
0.358787879 
0.304107744 
1 
 
Minput.i 
Minput.i is a representative input file. The input values for the utility functions 
are given in a single string. This example is the uranium-plutonium fast reactor 
irradiated blanket with no safeguards in place.  
1890 
19 
10000 
solid 
0.5 
y y n n n n 
200 
0.287 
1.068 
0 
never 
2 
90 
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0 
0.05 
1 
1 
1 
80 
20 
50 
50 
1890 
19 
solid 
0.5 
0.2 
0 
8000 
911 
1213 
0.323439996 
0.2 
0.5 
328759 
1 
0 
5 
7 
2 
20 
0.5 
0.083333333 
0.31 
0 
0 
100 
2 
100 
10000 
1000 
6.724 
0 
0 
5000 
6.724 
171 
1 
7 
0.06455 
0 
0.82 
1.0 
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